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I. INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH C ARE SHARING M INISTRIES
Individuals and families face difficult choices about health care as the costs of
medical care and health insurance continues to rise, and as the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act’s “Individual Mandate” approaches. Well over 160,000
Americans have found a solution for the high costs of medical care and health
insurance through the services of Health Care Sharing Ministries (HCSMs).1
Members of HCSMs also have the benefit of a religious exemption from the
“Individual Mandate” in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).2
In brief, these ministries provide “a health care cost sharing arrangement among
persons of similar and sincerely held beliefs.”3 HCSMs are not-for-profit religious
organizations that act as clearinghouses for “those who have medical expenses and
1
What is a Health Care Sharing Ministry?, THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING
MINISTRIES, available at http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm (last visited May 27, 2013);
see also Twila Brase, MEDICAL SHARING, An Inexpensive Alternative to Health Insurance,
CITIZENS’ COUNCIL ON HEALTH CARE, 1 (January 2010), http://www.cchfreedom.org/pr/MED
ICAL_SHARING-FINAL_JAN2010.pdf. The number of people participating in HCSMs is
higher than reported on the Alliance website. See infra text accompanying note 7.
2
3

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2012).

See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1 (the Alliance
represents two HCSMs, the Christian Care Ministry Medi-Share program and Samaritan
Ministries International).

2013]

HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES

221

those who desire to share the burden of those medical expenses.”4 The Alliance of
Health Care Sharing Ministries, which represents two of the three major HCSMs,
provides this further information:5
•
•

•
•
•
•

HCSMs receive no funding or grants from government sources.
HCSMs are not insurance companies. HCSMs do not assume
any risk or guarantee the payment of any medical bill. Twentyone states as of August 2012 have explicitly recognized this and
specifically shelter HCSMs from their insurance codes.6
HCSMs serve more than 160,000 people, with participating
households in all fifty states.7
HCSMs’ participants share more than $120 million per year for
one another’s health care costs.
HCSMs strive to be accessible to participants regardless of their
income.
Traditionally, HCSM costs are a fraction of the cost of insurance
rates.8

Health Care Sharing Ministries have operated in the United States for about
thirty years.9 HCSMs are “founded on the biblical mandate of believers to share
each other’s needs.”10 HCSM members “seek to apply Galatians 6:2, ‘Bear one
another’s burdens, and thus fulfill the law of Christ’ to . . . ever-rising medical costs
which can be quite burdensome for anyone . . . ”11 HCSMs enshrine “a principle that
has been around since the birth and growth of the early Church. The Book of Acts
reports, ‘All the believers were together and had everything in common. Selling their
possessions and goods, they gave to anyone as he had need.’”12 Christian members
of HCSMs “are making a decision to be there for their neighbor in need and bring
glory to God in the process of sharing.”13
This Article begins with a survey of the general regulatory landscape for
HCSMs. Following that, four key questions about HCSMs structure the rest of this
Article. The first question asks, what are HCSMs? To answer that question, this
4

See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.

5

See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.

6

E-mail from John Creath, Pub. Pol’y Specialist, Samaritan Ministries, to Benjamin
Boyd (July 20, 2012, 13:48 MT) (on file with author) (as of August 2012, 21 states have
exemptions for HCSMs).
7

E-mail from Brian Heller, Gen. Counsel, Samaritan Ministries, to Benjamin Boyd (July
26, 2012, 08:43 MT) (on file with the author) (Heller states there are now over 160,000
HCSM members.).
8

See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.

9

See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.

10

See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.

11

See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.

12

See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.

13

See THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, supra note 1.
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Article examines the basic aspects of the Medi-Share program and the Christian
Brotherhood Newsletter. Second, this Article asks, what law applies to HCSMs? In
reply, this Article briefly surveys the key elements of insurance law and the law
governing HCSMs. Third, this Article asks, how have courts treated HCSMs? To
answer, this Article surveys two key state court decisions involving HCSMs.
Fourth, this Article asks, how should courts treat HCSMs? To answer the last
question, the Article examines U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the legal and logical
problems courts and insurance regulators face by forcing HCSMs into insurance law,
and lastly examines some important considerations lingering on the sidelines – the
freedom of contract, the freedom of religion, the separation of powers, the
implications of HCSMs’ status as charitable religious organizations, and federal
preemption of the regulation of HCSMs under PPACA. This Article concludes first
by examining the epilogue to the Reinhold14 decision in Kentucky and second by
providing some general observations and analysis about HCSMs.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
HCSMs certainly sound commendable, but how have state and federal
government officials viewed HCSMs? HCSMs do have some friends in the corridors
of state power.15 James Atterholt, Indiana Insurance Commissioner, opined that
HCSMs are “a group of charitable organizations . . . are providing a much needed
answer to one of the greatest problems affecting all Americans today: the payment of
medical expenses.”16 Atterholt continued: “[t]he members of these organizations
have voluntarily joined their respective communities to put their faith into practice
by supporting one another in some of their most serious times of need, much like
religious communities such as the Amish have done for centuries.”17 Further:
[t]hese charitable organizations have already been there providing the
solution, one individual at a time. HCSM members are putting their
beliefs into actual, day-to-day practice, that it is their responsibility to
bear burdens of the members of the community which they voluntarily
joined because of their common faith and values.18
Atterholt concluded, “I would encourage all regulators to respect citizens’ rights
to freely pursue their own solutions for their medical expenses, and recognize
HCSMs for what they are: charitable organizations serving individuals who
voluntarily support one another in their time of need.”19
Likewise, Ralph Hudgens, Georgia’s Commissioner of Insurance, found HCSMs
“a remarkable free-market approach to paying for medical bills.”20 Hudgens reported
14

Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2010).

15

Letter from James Atterholt, Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Ins. to James Lansberry, President,
Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries (May 7, 2009) (on file with author).
16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Letter from Ralph T. Hudgens, Comm’r of Ins., State of Ga., to James Lansberry,
President, Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries (Mar. 4, 2011) (on file with author).
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Georgia has “not had any problems with Health Care Sharing.”21 Mr. Hudgens
concluded, “Health Care Sharing Ministries are not insurance companies but
charitable organizations helping participants pay their medical bills. I applaud your
efforts to find free market solutions to improve access to health care.”22 Further, Mr.
John Doak, Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner, wrote that “[m]any members of
these organizations say they also receive spiritual support from their health-care
sharing ministry, beyond the financial impact of the group.”23 After noting that
PPACA exempts “members of a health-care sharing ministry from being required to
purchase private insurance,” Doak continued: “[a]s a man of great faith, an opponent
of PPACA, and an advocate of free-market solutions to insurance issues, I support
health-care sharing ministries as an option for Oklahoma consumers.”24
Apparently, HCSMs also have some allies in the halls of Congress. As noted
above, PPACA contains a religious exemption for HCSM members from the
mandate to purchase insurance.25 Why would these relatively small ministries
receive a religious exemption from the individual mandate? HCSM representatives
persuaded Senate staff members with “more than just an argument based on freedom
of religion . . . .”26 “[T]hey pointed to the Obama administration's promise that those
who were happy with their current health coverage could keep it.”27 HCSM
subscribers received a religious exemption from PPACA’s individual mandate
precisely because HCSM members are paying their bills and sharing other members’
medical expenses.28 In the words of the Act, the “medical expenses of its members
have been shared . . . .”29 The HCSM religious exemption from PPACA’s individual
mandate, coupled with HCSMs’ remarkably low rates when compared to the costs of
health insurance, have contributed to an increased interest in HCSMs.30
21

Id. (“As far as I know, we have had no consumer complaints.”).

22

Id.

23

John D. Doak, Understanding Faith-Based Options for Health Care, OK.GOV (Aug. 22,
2012), http://www.ok.gov/triton/modules/newsroom/newsroom_article.php?id=157&article_
id=3765.
24

Id.

25

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West 2012); see
also, Christians Are Exempt From Insurance Mandates, CHRISTIAN CARE MINISTRY (Aug. 1,
2012), http://mychristiancare.org/exemption.aspx.
26

Steve Twedt, Health Care Overhaul Law Exempts Sharing Ministries, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (July 3, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/health/health-careoverhaul-law-exempts-sharing-ministries-269561/?p=0.
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)
(West 2012).
30
Interest in Samaritan Ministries Increases Following SCOTUS Decision on Health Care
Law, PRWEB.COM (July 5, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/samaritanministries/07/pr
web9668682.htm; see also Christine A. Scheller, ‘Obamacare’ Prevails: Supreme Court
Upholds Healthcare Law, URBAN FAITH (June 28, 2012), http://www.urbanfaith.com/2012/06/
obamacare-prevails-supreme-court-upholds-healthcare-law.html/.
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However, HCSMs do have some foes in the corridors of state power. HCSMs
have not gone without challenge, despite their evident charitable and religious
emphasis. The Kansas Insurance Commissioner, while recognizing the truly
“religious programs,” nevertheless believed PPACA’s religious exemption for
HCSMs will lead to “scammers . . . creating fake ministries and soliciting
members.”31 One observer called an HCSM a Ponzi scheme.32 An appellate judge
voiced concerns that an HCSM subjected subscribers to “potential scams and other
unscrupulous tactics.”33 Judge Nickell of Kentucky’s Court of Appeals thought
Medi-Share was “at best, a supplemental plan for payment of the health care needs
of its trusting subscribers, and, at worst, a poor substitute for regulated health
insurance.”34 A few state insurance departments have gone farther, and brought legal
challenges to these ministries, maintaining HCSMs operate as illegal insurance
companies.35
Most recently, the State of Washington’s Insurance Commissioner, Mike
Kriedler, issued Samaritan Ministries its first36 cease-and-desist order on April 1,
2011, “telling Samaritan to stop engaging in the unauthorized business of insurance
31
Michelle Andrews, Some Church Groups Form Sharing Ministries To Cover Members'
Medical Costs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/
features/insuring-your-health/michelle-andrews-on-health-care-religious-cooperatives.aspx.
32
Michael deCourcey Hinds, Christian Group Criticized As Unsound Insurance Plan, N.
Y. TIMES (June 14, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/14/us/christian-group-criticizedas-unsound-insurance-plan.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (“Mr. Needham said the
brotherhood program was like a Ponzi scheme, requiring a constant flow of new investors to
pay off those who joined the scheme earlier.”) Needham was a spokesman for Delaware’s
Department of Insurance. Id.
33
Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 2008 WL 4530900 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2008)
(Thompson, J., dissenting) (Judge Thompson also noted: “consumers in states such as Ohio
have incurred the financial consequences of the lack of regulation of such businesses.” Judge
Thompson was referring to a prior incident in 2001 where Ohio’s Attorney General filed suit
against the Christian Brotherhood Newsletter, the oldest HCSM, charging the founder of the
ministry, Bruce Hawthorn, with fraud and conversion of ministry funds and property. Ohio’s
“lawsuit demands return of property and cash valued at more than $2.4 million . . . ”); see
generally Chuck Fager, Lawsuit: Health Plan Accused, CHRISTIANITY TODAY ONLINE (Apr. 2,
2001), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/april2/8.23.html (“The Christian
Brotherhood Newsletter had to repay nearly $15 million that previous management spent on
homes, motorcycles and luxury cars. The company was placed in receivership in 2001, and the
management was removed.”); see Sarah Skidmore, Sharing the Burden: Regulation-Free
Religious Groups Offer Cost-Sharing Alternatives to Traditional Health Insurance by
Banning Risky, High-Cost Behavior, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Jan. 8, 2006), http://www.
utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060108/news_lz1b8burden.html (after this lawsuit, the
Newsletter continued to operate under new management with established safeguards to
prevent future problems).
34

See Reinhold, 2008 WL 4530900 (Nickell, J., concurring in result only).

35

See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Agency Action And Opportunity for Hearing,
(Administrative Fine, Permanent Cease and Desist Order and Restitution, In re Am.
Evangelical Ass’n, Case No. 2006-1 (Mont. Auditor May 22, 2007), available at
http://www.sao.mt.gov/legal/insurance/pdf/I07_Medishare Notice.pdf.
36

See Andrews, supra note 31, (“[t]his month's action was the first against Samaritan
Ministries . . . .”).
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in Washington State [sic].”37 Commissioner Kriedler stated: "[t]hey've made a
commitment to what is effectively health insurance, that when you need to have your
medical bills paid they'll help or will pay those costs for you . . . ."38 Kriedler also
stated, "[o]ur insurance laws exist to protect consumers and make sure that insurers
live up to their promises . . . [m]embers of groups like this don't have those
protections."39 In an effort to steer clear of insurance regulations, HCSMs have
worked for statutory “safe harbors” from state insurance codes in twenty-one
states.40 Indeed, Washington’s Insurance Commissioner lifted Samaritan Ministries’
cease-and-desist order when the Washington Legislature and Governor Gregoire
acted quickly to pass Wash. S.S.B. 5122 within 40 days of the cease and desist
order.41 Wash. S.S.B. 5122 excluded HCSMs from regulation under Washington’s
Insurance Code.42
At times, state insurance and commerce departments have brought legal actions
against HCSMs, alleging the specific ministries engaged in the unauthorized sale of
insurance, or the sale of insurance without a license.43 The freedom to share health
care costs through HCSMs has depended largely on whether the courts and state
insurance regulators view HCSMs as insurance, which is one of the key legal
questions this Article examines. In the last fifteen years, just two state supreme
courts have issued reported decisions on whether a health care sharing ministry
provides a contract for insurance.44
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered whether the Christian Care
Ministry and its Medi-Share program provided a “contract for insurance” in the case
of Commonwealth v. Reinhold.45 Kentucky’s Supreme Court held Medi-Share did
provide a “contract for insurance” and did not fall within Kentucky’s Religious
37
Samaritan Ministries Ordered to Stop Offering Unauthorized Insurance in Washington
State, WASH. OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/aboutoic/news-media/news-releases/2011/4-01-2011.html.
38

Andrews, supra note 31.

39

Vanessa Ho, State Shuts Down Health-Care Sharing Ministry, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/State-shuts-downhealth-care-sharing-ministry-1319041.php.
40

See infra Appendix B.

41

S.S.B. 5122, 2011 Leg., 62nd Sess. (Wash. 2011); Wash. Office of the Ins. Comm’r,
Order to Cease and Desist Rescinded, (2011), http://www.insurance.wa.gov/oicfiles/orders
/2011orders/11-0075.pdf.
42

See Wash. Rev. Code § 48.43.009 (West 2012); S.S.B. 5122, supra note 41.

43

See Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2010), reh’g denied; Barberton
Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Insurance Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 N.W.2d 352
(Iowa 1998), reh’g denied.
44
Christian Bhd. Newsletter v. Williams, 634 A.2d 938 (Del. 1993), aff’g Christian Bhd.
Newsletter v. Levinson, C.A. No. 92A-06-016 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1993) (considering and
finding Christian Bhd. Newsletter (CBN) to be insurance). This Article will not examine in
detail the New Castle County Superior Court order behind the Delaware Supreme Court’s
unpublished order in Christian Bhd. Newsletter, focusing instead on the reported Reinhold and
Barberton cases.
45

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 273.
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Publication Exemption for HCSMs.46 The Kentucky Supreme Court’s 5-2 ruling
overturned a divided Kentucky Court of Appeals’ ruling.47 Justices Scott and
Cunningham dissented from the Reinhold majority.48 The dissent argued MediShare was not insurance49 and should receive shelter under Kentucky’s Religious
Publication Exemption.50
In 1998, Iowa’s Supreme Court also considered whether another HCSM was
simply providing a “contract for insurance,” the Christian Brotherhood Newsletter
(CBN), in Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Insurance Division of the Iowa
Department of Commerce.51 Iowa’s Supreme Court considered “(1) whether a
Christian newsletter, through which medical costs are spread among its subscribers,
constitutes an insurance contract; and (2) whether a recently enacted statute . . .
exempts the newsletter from regulation . . . ”52 The Supreme Court of Iowa
concluded the CBN plan was not insurance because the health care sharing ministry
lacked the key element of insurance, the assumption of risk.53 As the Barberton
court affirmed the lower court’s ruling on this ground, it declined to consider
whether Iowa’s Insurance Code exempted such plans from regulation.54
III. W HAT ARE HEALTH C ARE SHARING M INISTRIES?
A. Christian Care Ministries - Medi-Share
Medi-Share is a “‘sharing ministry’ providing Affordable, Biblical Healthcare.”55
“[P]eople voluntarily join the program … to help pay the medical bills of other
members.”56 Medi-Share is not licensed to sell insurance and thus avoids the
regulatory requirements and oversight to which insurance companies are subject.57
Prospective Medi-Share members fill out an application form, and Medi-Share
reviews this information to determine applicant eligibility.58 “[T]he application form
serves as a ‘commitment’ contract whereby the applicant promises to abide by
certain Medi[-]Share rules and regulations while participating in the program.”59 The
“commitment contract” places these responsibilities on Medi-Share members:
46

Id.

47

Id. at 279, referring to Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 2008 WL 4530900 (Ky. Ct. App.
Oct. 10, 2008).
48

Id.

49

Id. at 280-81.

50

Id. at 281-82.

51

Barberton Rescue Missions, 586 N.W.2d at 352.

52

Id. at 353, citing Iowa Code § 505.22 (1997).

53

Id. at 356-57.

54

Id. at 357.

55

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 273.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.
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I understand that I will be responsible each month to access the member
website, which identifies a fellow Christian who will be receiving my gift
toward their medical need. I will endeavor to pray for this person and to
give him or her encouragement by mail. I understand that my fellow
believers in Christ are relying upon the receipt of my monthly share by
the first of each month.60
Medi-Share’s commitment contract includes the following disclaimer:
I understand that Christian Care Ministry (CCM) matches a Medi[-]Share
member's medical need with other Members who have volunteered, in
faith, to share in meeting needs through the biblical concept of Christian
mutual sharing. I further understand that all money comes from the
voluntary giving of Members, not from the Christian Care Ministry, and
that the Christian Care Ministry is not liable for the payment of any
medical bills . . . 61
Medi-Share’s application form “expressly states that a Medi-Share contract is not
an insurance policy.”62 Medi-Share’s contractual disclaimer provides further:
ATTENTION—This publication is not issued by an insurance company,
nor is it offered through an insurance company. This publication does not
guarantee or promise that your medical bills will be published or assigned
to others for payment. Whether anyone chooses to pay your medical bills
is strictly voluntary. This publication should never be considered a
substitute for an insurance policy. Whether or not you receive any
payments for medical expenses and whether or not this publication
continues to operate, you are responsible for payment of your own
medical bills.63
Medi-Share’s cost-sharing ministry, as it existed at the time of the trial record in
the Reinhold case, operated as follows:
Medi-Share members send monthly “share” payments directly to MediShare. The organization retains a percentage of each “share” to cover its
administrative costs. Medi-Share places the rest of the “share” into a trust,
with sub-accounts designated for each member. These sub-accounts
function like escrow accounts.64 When a Medi-Share member has a
60

Id. at 274 (the “rules and regulations include that the applicant be committed to being a
Christian, live by ‘biblical standards,’ attend church regularly, not use tobacco or illegal drugs,
and refrain from abusing legal substances such as alcohol”).
61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Stephen Sullivan, General Counsel for Christian Care Ministries, Inc (Medi-Share),
reports:
Medi-Share's sharing process has substantially changed since the record in the
Reinhold case was created. The use of the trust and member sub-accounts has been
eliminated. Today, members deposit their sharing funds directly into their own
personal checking account for sharing with other members. If funds are needed to pay
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medical expense, the member pays the medical provider the applicable
co-pay. Then, the member sends a sharing request form directly to MediShare, who reviews the request to see if the medical bill is eligible for
sharing under Medi-Share’s guidelines. If so, Medi-Share then transfers
sharing funds directly from the sub-accounts of members that shared to
the sub-account of the member with the eligible medical bill. Medi-Share
then issues a check from that member's sub-account directly to the
member’s medical provider/s. Medi-Share determines which member subaccounts are used to fund the payment of eligible members’ sharing
requests; individual members have no control over which sharing requests
are paid from their sub-accounts. Thus, Medi-Share members do not
designate specific member recipients to receive their donation from their
sub-account. Medi-Share has member guidelines that define what types of
medical bills are eligible for sharing among the members, provides for
deductibles, and explains the yearly and lifetime caps on member sharing.
Medi-Share’s guidelines encourage members to use medical services
within a group of Preferred Providers, and do so by providing penalties
for using out-of-network providers.65
B. The Christian Brotherhood Newsletter - Christian
Healthcare Ministry
Christian Healthcare Ministries (CHM) is a non-profit ministry, founded in 1981.
CHM was the first nation-wide66 Health Care Sharing Ministry.67 Originally, CHM
went by the name “The Christian Brotherhood Newsletter” (CBN) and the
Newsletter’s members were termed “subscribers.”68 The ministry adopted the name
Christian Healthcare Ministries in 2006 and its participants are now called
“members.”69 CHM’s foundational Bible verse is Galatians 6:2: “[b]ear one
another’s burdens and so fulfill the law of Christ.”70 CHM also “points to the New

a medical bill, the funds are transferred directly between members' individual
checking accounts, with the check to the provider being issued from the checking
account of the member with the bill. Members never send their sharing funds to MediShare, and Medi-Share never receives their sharing funds.
E-mail from Stephen Sullivan, Gen. Counsel, Christian Care Ministries, Inc. (Medi-Share), to
Benjamin Boyd (Sept. 10, 2012 12:32 MT) (on file with author).
65

Id.

66

Nation-wide HCSMs are distinguished from local or church-based health care sharing.
There are a number of Mennonite church groups who have shared health care expenses on a
local basis for over fifty years. E-mail from Brian Heller, Gen. Counsel, Samaritan Ministries
Int’l, to Benjamin Boyd (Sept. 4, 2012, 09:36 MT) (on file with author).
67

E-mail from Rev. Howard Russell, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Christian
Healthcare Ministries, to Benjamin Boyd (Aug. 10, 2012 09:58 MT) (on file with author).
68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id., citing Galatians 6:2.
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Testament book of Acts, in which early Christians shared among themselves to meet
each other’s needs.”71
CHM’s members “share in meeting each other’s eligible medical bills up to
$125,000 per illness.”72 CHM also operates “a separate program called Brother’s
Keeper which enables members to share per-illness expenses up to $1 million.”73
CHM does not reject membership applications because of age or medical
conditions.74 “At the highest level of service in [CHM’s] main program[,] the
financial costs are $150 per individual [and are] capped at $450 per family regardless
of the number of immediate family members.”75 CHM staff determines whether a
member’s medical bills are eligible for cost-sharing based on CHM’s ministry
guidelines.76 Each member sends his or her monthly financial gifts to CHM, which
then sends the shared reimbursement for medical bills directly to a CHM’s member –
who pays his or her health care provider directly.77 CHM posts its financial
information on its website through Guidestar, a service that publishes such
information for non-profit organizations.78
When CHM operated as the Christian Brotherhood Newsletter, each Newsletter
contained the following disclaimer:
I understand that the Christian Brotherhood Newsletter is a publication
and not an insurance company. Any help I may receive will come directly
from other subscribers and not the publisher. I understand the publisher
will not be responsible to send me any money and will have no obligation
to me, other than to publish medical needs members have chosen to share,
for certain members of my family.79 I understand that the Christian
Brotherhood program does not provide, in any way, a contract for
indemnification of my medical expenses, death benefit or any other loss.
No subscriber is personally responsible to send gifts to the need
recommended to them in the newsletter. I am not guaranteed payment for
any need of mine that is published in the newsletter. I participate
voluntarily to practice Christian principles as the Bible teaches and to
contribute to others' needs. I agree that I have no legal recourse against
any subscriber or the publisher, even if I do not receive any money for
71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id. Guidestar publishes information about non-profit organizations. See GUIDESTAR,
http://www.guidestar.org/ (last visited April 10, 2013) (Guidestar’s report on Christian
Healthcare Ministries is available at: http://www.guidestar.org/organizations/341964742/christian-healthcare-ministries.aspx)
79
This sentence limits CBN’s/CHM’s obligation to its members to the provision of certain
publishing services. The following two sentences excludes indemnification by CBN, and
excludes assumption of the risk by CBN’s membership as well.
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needs of mine submitted for publication in the newsletter. I understand
that no contract for indemnification involving the Christian Brotherhood
Newsletter, staff, employees or subscribers exists.80
CHM’s current disclaimer is slightly shorter than the above disclaimer the
ministry previously used. 81
IV. W HAT LAW APPLIES TO HCSMS?
This section briefly summarizes the law that governs health care sharing
ministries. Legal challenges to HCSMs implicate two focused areas of law: the first
being the law providing HCSMs with “safe-harbor” protections from state insurance
regulation and the second being the law governing the nature of insurance.
First, in over 40% of the states, HCSMs are governed by so-called “safe harbor”
laws.82 The Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries explains that these laws “are
an important legislative avenue to protecting health care sharing ministries.”83 The
Alliance maintains that, “it is impossible” for HCSMs to meet “the same
requirements as insurance companies . . . without destroying the voluntary,
ministerial nature of our ministries.”84 The provisions of the safe harbor statutes
vary slightly from state to state. Virginia’s statutory definition of HCSMs, enacted
in 2008, is a typical example:
[a]s used in this chapter, “health care sharing ministry” means a health
care cost sharing arrangement among individuals of the same religion
based on their sincerely held religious beliefs, which arrangement is
administered by a non-profit organization that has been granted an
exemption from federal income taxation pursuant to § 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and that:

80
Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Ins. Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586
N.W.2d 352, 353-354 (Iowa 1998).
81

Legal Notices, CHRISTIAN HEALTHCARE MINISTRIES, http://www.cbnews.org/legal
notices.aspx. The current online disclaimer reads:
Christian Healthcare Ministries (hereinafter “CHM”), a not-for-profit religious
organization, is not an insurance company. No ministry operations or publications are
offered through or operated by an insurance company. CHM does not guarantee or
promise that your medical bills will be shared or assigned to others for financial gifts.
Whether any CHM member chooses to share the burden of your medical bills will be
entirely voluntary. As such, CHM should never be considered as a substitute for an
insurance policy. Whether you receive any financial gifts for medical expenses and
whether CHM continues to operate, you are always liable for any unpaid bills.
CHM also employs several state-specific legal notices. Id.
82

E-mail from John Creath, Pub. Policy Specialist, Samaritan Ministries, to Benjamin
Boyd (July 20, 2012, 14:49 MT) (on file with author). As of August 2012, 21 states have
exemptions for HCSMs. See, e.g., Current State Issues, THE ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE
SHARING MINISTRIES, http://www.healthcaresharing.org/issues/index.php?State=None; see
infra Appendix B.
83

Current State Issues, supra note 82.

84

Current State Issues, supra note 82.
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1. Limits its membership to individuals who are of a similar faith;
2. Acts as an organizational clearinghouse for information about members
who have financial or medical needs and matches them with members
with the present ability to assist those with financial or medical needs, all
in accordance with the organization's criteria;
3. Provides for the financial or medical needs of a member through
payments directly from one member to another. The requirements of this
subdivision 3 may be satisfied by a trust established solely for the benefit
of members, which trust is audited annually by an independent auditing
firm;85
4. Provides amounts that members/subscribers may contribute with (i) no
assumption of risk or promise to pay among the members and (ii) no
assumption of risk or promise to pay by the organization to the members;
5. Provides written monthly statements to all members that list the total
dollar amount of qualified needs submitted to the organization by
members for their contribution; and
6. Provides in substance the following written disclaimer on or
accompanying all promotional documents distributed by or on behalf of
the organization, including applications and guideline materials:
“Notice:
This publication is not insurance, and is not offered through an insurance
company. Whether anyone chooses to assist you with your medical bills
will be totally voluntary, as no other member will be compelled by law to
contribute toward your medical bills. As such, this publication should
never be considered to be insurance. Whether you receive any payments
for medical expenses and whether or not this publication continues to
operate, you are always personally responsible for the payment of your
own medical bills.”86
The next section of the Virginia Code contains the “safe harbor” for HCSMs:
[t]he provisions of this title shall not apply to a health care sharing
ministry. A health care sharing ministry that, through its publication to
members, solicits funds for the payment of medical expenses of other
members, shall not be considered to be engaging in the business of
insurance for purposes of this title and shall not be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.87
In contrast, the state of Washington adopted a terse safe harbor law for HCSMs:
“[h]ealth care sharing ministries are not health carriers as defined in RCW 48.43.005
or insurers as defined in RCW 48.01.050. For purposes of this section, “health care

85

VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6300 (West 2012). This provision in Virginia’s safe harbor
statute varies from Kentucky’s “Religious Publication” exemption, KY. REV. ST. ANN. §
304.1-120(7)(d) (If Kentucky’s statute included this clause, the Reinhold case should have
gone the other way).
86

VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6300 (West 2012).

87

VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6301 (West 2012).
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sharing ministry” has the same meaning as in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5000A.88 A complete
list of the states with HCSM exemptions follows this Article in Appendix B.89
Second, legal challenges to HCSMs historically have implicated a key legal
concept in insurance law: the assumption of risk. The majority of states view the
assumption of risk as an essential or foundational element of an insurance contract.90
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted “[t]he primary elements of an insurance
contract are the spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk.”91 A California
court viewed “the element of shifting of the risk of loss” as an essential element of
insurance.92 A Florida court stated: “[h]azard is essential . . . [i]f there is no risk, . . .
there can be [no] insurance.”93 The Illinois Court of Appeals stated, “the presence
of risk is the essence of an insurance contract.” 94 The Kansas Supreme Court
explained, “the assumption of a risk” is “the principal object and purpose” of the
insurance business.95 This presence – or absence – of the “primary characteristic . . .
of insurance” determines whether HCSMs are insurance.96 If HCSMs possess this
88

WASH. REV. CODE. § 48.43.009 (West 2012) (referencing the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act’s definition of health care sharing ministries, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A,
(West 2012)). Washington’s safe harbor statute defers to Congress’ definition of “health care
sharing ministry” in PPACA, which arguably preempts any state legislative definition to the
contrary.
89

See infra Appendix B.

90

See infra Appendix A.

91

Carter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 A.2d 466, 472 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002),
quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979); see also
Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 17 So.
3d 350, n.7 (La. 2009) (stating that “[t]he primary characteristic of the business of insurance is
the transferring or spreading of risk. So long as this characteristic is present, the business of
insurance is not limited to traditionally recognized areas of insurance,” citing Klamath–Lake
Pharm. Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1983)).
92

Richardson v. GAB Bus. Serv., Inc., 207 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(citation omitted); see also, Warnig v. Atlantic Cnty. Special Serv., 833 A.2d 1098, 1104 (N.J.
Super. 2003) (“[t]he essential nature of insurance is that risk is shifted to the insurer for the
payment of a premium. It is a gamble.”)
93

Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Abernathy, 93 So. 3d 352, 359 (Fla. Ct. App. 2012);
quoting Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (“there must be a
risk of loss to which one party may be subjected by contingent or future events and an
assumption of it by legally binding arrangement by another. Even the most loosely stated
conceptions of insurance and indemnity require these element[s]”).
94
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., Inc., 694 N.E.2d 1049,
1054 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998), citing U.S. Liability Ins. Co. v. Selman, 70 F.3d 684, 690 (1st Cir.
1995) (“[a]ccordingly, where there is no risk of loss, as where a loss occurred prior to
the policy taking effect, insurance ceases to serve its purpose of risk-spreading.”)
95

State ex rel. Londerholm v. Anderson, 408 P.2d 864, 875 (Kan. 1966), citing 44 C.J.S.
Insurance § 59; see also, Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Ins. Div. of the Iowa Dept. of
Commerce, 586 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1998) (“to be considered insurance, the assumption
of risk by the promoter must be the “principal object and purpose of the program,” citing
Appleman & Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 7002 at 14 (1981)).
96
Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund v. Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n,
17 So.3d 350, n.7 (La. 2009) (“[t]he primary characteristic of the business of insurance is the
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characteristic, “the business of insurance is not limited to traditionally recognized
areas of insurance.”97 Yet, if HCSMs lack this shifting or assumption of risk, “there
is not an insurance contract.”98
This Article now turns to consider how courts have regarded HCSMs,
beginning first with the Reinhold opinion from Kentucky.
V. HOW HAVE COURTS TREATED HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES?
A. Commonwealth v. Reinhold: Medi-Share is Insurance
The primary issue in Reinhold was “whether Medi-Share provides a contract for
insurance . . . .”99 The Reinhold majority explained, “[t]he lower court decisions . . .
incorrectly determined that the Medi-Share program did not shift risk because each
individual member remains personally liable for paying his own medical bills.”100
The Reinhold majority opined that the lower courts overlooked “the risk-shifting
nature of the ‘commitment’ contract that [Medi-Share] members enter into . . . and
thus the lower courts erroneously concluded that the process does not constitute a
‘contract for insurance’ . . . .”101
First, the Reinhold majority noted that the wording of Medi-Share’s
“commitment” contract, standing alone, was not controlling.102 Rather, “[i]t is the
transferring or spreading of risk. So long as this characteristic is present, the business of
insurance is not limited to traditionally recognized areas of insurance.”), (citing Klamath–
Lake Pharm. Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1983).
97

Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen Self-Insurers Fund, 17 So.3d at n.7.

98

Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 420 S.E.2d 432, 435 (N.C. 1992) (“One
characteristic of an insurance contract is the shifting of a risk from the insured to the insurer.
If no risk is shifted there is not an insurance contract.”).
99
Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Ky. 2010), citing KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304.1-030 (defining insurance as “a contract whereby one undertakes to pay or
indemnify another as to loss from certain specified contingencies or perils called ‘risks,’ or to
pay or grant a specified amount or determinable benefit or annuity in connection with
ascertainable risk contingencies, or to act as surety.”)
100

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 276.

101

Id.

102

Id. at 277 (citing 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 4 (1982)):

[i]t is immaterial, or at least not controlling, that the term “insurance” nowhere
appears in the contract the nature of which is to be determined; indeed, the fact that it
states that it is not an insurance policy is not conclusive, and a company may be found
to be engaged in an insurance business even though it expressly disclaims any
intention to sell insurance. Neither are the terms or mode of payment of the
consideration determinative of the question whether the contract is one of insurance.
The nature of a contract as one of insurance depends upon its contents and the true
character of the contract actually entered into or issued—that is, whether a contract is
one of insurance is to be determined by a consideration of the real character of the
promise or of the act to be performed, and by a consideration of the exact nature of the
agreement in light of the occurrence, contingency, or circumstances under which the
performance becomes requisite, and not by what it is called.
43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 4 (1982).
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actual nature and effect of the “commitment” 103 contract that determines whether it
is one for insurance.”104 The Kentucky Supreme Court noted: “one cannot change
the nature of insurance business by declaring in the contract that it is not
insurance.”105 The Reinhold majority focused on three key aspects of Medi-Share’s
program: Medi-Share member obligations; what Medi-Share members may receive
in return for keeping their obligations; and Medi-Share’s alleged use of actuarial
tables.106
As for Medi-Share’s member obligations, the commitment contract “obligates
Medi-Share members to pay their monthly ‘share’ by the first of the month because
their ‘fellow believers in Christ’ rely upon that payment to satisfy their medical
needs.”107 And as to what members receive, “[i]n return for paying the monthly
“share,” Medi-Share members remain eligible to receive payment for their medical
needs through the program.”108 The Reinhold majority opined,
[t]his process clearly shifts the risk of payment for medical expenses from
the individual member to the pool of sub-accounts from which his
expenses will be paid. Thus, regardless of how Medi-Share defines itself
or what disclaimers it includes in its literature, in the final analysis, there
is a shifting of risk.109
Addressing Medi-Share’s alleged use of actuarial tables, the majority analyzed
Medi-Share’s high level of success in paying members’ claims, evidently due to the
use of these statistical actuarial tables.110 The majority stated that Medi-Share used
103
Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277. (quoting Wheeler v. Ben Hur Life Ass’n., 264 S.W.2d
289, 291 (Ky. 1953)):

[b]roadly speaking . . . when a company, society, or association, either voluntary or
incorporated, and known as a relief, benevolent or benefit society, or by some similar
name, contracts for a consideration to pay a sum of money upon the happening of a
certain contingency, and the prevalent purpose and nature of the organization is that of
insurance, it will be regarded as an insurance company, and its contracts as insurance
contracts, regardless of the manner or mode of payment of consideration or of loss or
benefit.
Wheeler, 264 S.W.2d at 291.
104

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. v. Ins. Div. of the
Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 N.W.2d 352 (Iowa 1998)). Interestingly, Kentucky’s Reinhold
majority cited Iowa’s Barberton decision, but reached the exact opposite conclusion as the
Iowa Supreme Court. Id.
105

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Allin v. Motorists’ Alliance of America, 29
S.W.2d 19, 23 (Ky. 1930)). The sole question was “whether the matters and things
enumerated in the contract … constitute the business of insurance ….” Id. at 21.
106

Email from Stephen Sullivan, Gen. Counsel, Christian Care Ministries, Inc. (MediShare), to Benjamin Boyd (Sept. 10, 2012 12:32 MT) (on file with author) (Medi-Share
actually does not use actuarial tables to calculate member shares).
107

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277 (emphasis original).

108

Id.

109

Id.

110

Id.
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actuarial tables to calculate each member’s monthly “share” at a “level
commensurate with anticipated future member medical claims.”111 The majority
believed the use of actuarial tables operated to shift risk like a traditional insurance
company does.112 With that rationale, the majority restated their holding that MediShare shifts risk between Medi-Share members “in the same manner traditional
health insurance contracts shift risk between policyholders.”113
In response, Medi-Share argued their disclaimer indicates that no risk shifting
occurs.114 The disclaimer states “Medi-Share takes no responsibility for the payment
of the members’ medical bills.”115 The Reinhold majority acknowledged the
disclaimer perhaps shields Medi-Share from “any liability for its members’ medical
bills.”116 Nonetheless, the majority observed this disclaimer “does not overcome the
fact that through the Medi-Share program the individual members pool resources
together to distribute the risk of major medical bills amongst each other.”117 The
Reinhold majority observed, “one cannot change the nature of an insurance business
by simply declaring in the contract that it is not insurance.”118
In sum, the Reinhold majority found that Medi-Share’s “‘commitment’ contract
was one for insurance” under Kentucky law for two main reasons.119 First, through
the commitment contract, Medi-Share members “undertake[] to pay or indemnify
another as to loss from certain specified contingencies or perils called ‘risks’.”120
Second, Medi-Share itself also “‘undertakes’ to actually pool the members' monthly
“shares” together and pay members’ actual medical bills as claims for payment are
submitted.”121 The Reinhold majority concluded, “[t]hus, the “commitment” contract
is, in practice and function, one for insurance.”122
B. Commonwealth v. Reinhold: Medi-Share Does Not Qualify
for the Religious Publication Exemption
Kentucky’s Supreme Court considered, secondly, assuming that Medi-Share was
a “contract for insurance,” whether it was exempt from state regulation under
Kentucky’s statutory Religious Publication Exception.123 The exception provides
that no provisions of Kentucky’s Insurance Code apply to “[a] religious publication
111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 278.

116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id. (citing KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304-1-030).

121

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278.

122

Id.

123

Id. (citing KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(d)).
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(as identified in this subsection), or its subscribers, that limit their operations to those
activities, and . . . [p]ays for the subscribers' financial or medical needs by payments
directly from one (1) subscriber to another . . . .”124
The Reinhold majority opined, “for Medi-Share to qualify for the Religious
Publications Exception, it must meet every criterion listed. . . . Medi-Share does
not.”125 The Reinhold majority found Medi-Share’s members failed to pay
subscriber’s needs “directly from one (1) subscriber to another.”126 The Kentucky
court reasoned, “[t]o satisfy the requirement of subsection (d), the religious
publication must be set up so that one subscriber sends the money for assistance to
the other subscriber without having the money passing through an intermediary.”127
The Kentucky high court concluded “Medi-Share . . . does not qualify for the
Religious Publication Exception.”128
1. The Reinhold Dissent: Medi-Share is Not Insurance
The Reinhold dissent, authored by Justice Scott and joined by Justice
Cunningham, believed Medi-Share was not in the business of insurance129 and
maintained Medi-Share did not fall within “the ambit of definitional insurance.”130
First, Justice Scott believed Medi-Share was not insurance because “the
relationship between Medi-Share and its subscribers does not amount to a
distribution of risk between the policy holder (the subscribers) and Medi-Share (the
conduit to the pool of subscribers).”131 Justice Scott, quoting the U.S. Supreme
Court, described insurance as “an arrangement for transferring and distributing
risk”132 that “has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk.”133 The
124

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278-79.

125

Id. at 279 (citing Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802, 809 (Ky. 1990) (“This
conclusion is inescapable because otherwise the General Assembly would have used the
disjunctive ‘or’ instead of the conjunctive ‘and’”).
126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Id. Kentucky’s Supreme Court reasoned:

Medi-Share does not operate in this manner. Medi-Share serves as an intermediary by
which monthly “shares” from members are collected and held until being used to pay
other members' needs. Medi-Share determines which needs are paid, how they are
paid, and when they are paid. Each “subscribers' needs” are thus not paid directly
from one subscriber to another, but through Medi-Share.
Id.
129

Id. at 280 (Scott, J., dissenting).

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id. (citing Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979)):

[t]he primary elements of an insurance contract are the spreading and underwriting of
a policyholder's risk. “It is characteristic of insurance that a number of risks are
accepted, some of which involve losses, and that such losses are spread over all the
risks so as to enable the insurer to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible
liability upon it.”
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dissent argued: “the distribution of risk between the policy holder and the insurer” is
“central to the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of the ‘business of
insurance.’”134 Justice Scott believed “the system set up by Medi-Share shifts the
risk from one subscriber (the insured) to the pool of subscribers (the insurers) . . .
.”135 The dissenting justice concluded, “Medi-Share is in the business of promoting
and managing a cost-sharing organization . . . not . . . the business of insurance
itself.”136
Justice Scott explained that Medi-Share members, not the Medi-Share
organization, bear the risk.137 The dissent based this on Medi-Share’s commitment
contract, which states Medi-Share takes no responsibility for the payment of the
members’ medical bills.138 Both the Reinhold majority and dissent recognized this
disclaimer shields Medi-Share from liability for its members’ bills.139 The dissent
pressed further: “what risk does Medi-Share, as an entity, bear? . . . clearly none.”140
Justice Scott maintained the majority did not distinguish exactly who distributed or
bore the risk: “the majority reasons that the contract language alone does not
overcome ‘the fact that through the Medi-Share program the individual members
pool resources together to distribute the risk of major medical bills amongst each
other.’”141 Scott agreed there was a shifting of risk, but argued, “this does not
support a legal finding that Medi-Share is in the business of insurance, but rather that
Medi-Share is in the business of administrating and managing a cost-sharing
organization on behalf of others—in this instance, people of faith.”142

Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 440 U.S. at 211.
133

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 280 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 743 (1985))
[o]ur federal counterpart has identified three criteria that indicate that a company is in
the “business of insurance”: (1) whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 743.
134

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 280.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id. at 274 (the Medi-Share commitment reads so: “I further understand that all money
comes from the voluntary giving of Members, not from the Christian Care Ministry, and that
the Christian Care Ministry is not liable for the payment of any medical bills.”).
139

Id. at 278, 280.

140

Id. at 280-81.

141

Id. at 281 (emphasis in original).

142

Id. Justice Scott continued, “[i]n contrast, a true insurance company takes on risks and
the company itself bears those risks, not the individually insured policy holders.”
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Second, Justice Scott believed “Medi-Share's contract does not meet the
definition of insurance . . . .”143 The dissent again focused on exactly who undertook
to pay another for risks. Justice Scott referred to Kentucky’s statutory definition of
insurance 144 and maintained, “in order for Medi-Share to fit this definition, it would
have to undertake to pay or indemnify another for risks, or to pay or grant a specified
amount or to act as a surety.”145 However, the dissent concluded “Medi-Share does
none of these . . . activities . . . assumed by the members of the pool, since each of
them agrees to pay for the other’s losses in exchange for other members paying for
their losses.”146
2. The Reinhold Dissent: If Medi-Share is Insurance, it Should Fall Under the
Religious Publication Exemption.
Justice Scott believed Medi-Share substantially complied with the Religious
Publication Exemption and would have considered “it exempt from state
regulation.”147 He reasoned, “in denying Medi-Share the protection outlined in KRS
304.1–120(7), the majority makes much of sub-section (d), and particularly the fact
that the subscribers of Medi-Share do not make payments directly to and from one
another.”148 Justice Scott recognized Medi-Share’s procedure passes payments
through an “intermediary” rather than from subscriber to subscriber, but argued “that
procedure does not force the conclusion that the payments are not directly made
from one subscriber to another.”149
Justice Scott reasoned that Medi-Share acts as a trustee, bank, attorney, or
agent,150 and believed “Medi-Share is a conduit rather than an intermediary.”151
Justice Scott argued, “this Court would not hold that simply because one acts
through an agent or via a trustee that one has not acted in a direct manner.”152 The
dissent noted Kentucky law impugns “upon the principal the acts of its agents as if
they proceeded directly from the principal.”153 He reasoned that Medi-Share’s
discretionary authority on behalf of Medi-Share’s subscribers does not make the
actions undertaken any less direct.154 Justice Scott also believed that Kentucky’s

143

Id. at 281.

144

Id. (citing Ky. Rev. St. Ann. § 304.1–030 (West 2013)).

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Id. at 282.

149

Id.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153
Id. (quoting Preferred Risk Fire Ins. Co. v. Neet, 90 S.W.2d 39, 42 (1935)), (emphasis
in original).
154

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 282.
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Religious Publications Exemption specifically allowed this type of delegation and
discretion in the administration of such cost-sharing organizations.155
Justice Scott concluded that “Medi-Share is in substantial compliance with KRS
304.1–120(7) and the spirit of that rule.”156 The dissent believed the Religious
Publication Exception’s protections should not be stripped from Medi-Share
“because payments are made at the direction of Medi-Share after subscribers have
delegated this duty to Medi-Share, particularly when Medi-Share already statutorily
possesses the authority to function in an administrative capacity.”157
This Article now turns to Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. v. Insurance Division
of Iowa, where the Iowa Supreme Court considered whether the “Christian
Brotherhood Newsletter,” (CBN) which then operated under the Barberton Rescue
Mission, was insurance under Iowa law.
C. Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. v. Insurance Division of Iowa: the Christian
Brotherhood Newsletter is Not Insurance
Iowa’s Supreme Court focused on the initial question: “[i]s this insurance?”158 In
May 1992, Iowa’s Insurance Division “charged Barberton with selling insurance
without a license. It requested the imposition of civil penalties and insurance
premium taxes.”159 The Insurance Division’s final decision stated: “Barberton was
in fact selling insurance and was subject to supervision. It found that Barberton was
subject to payment of the premium tax under Iowa Code section 507A.9 . . . .”160
Iowa’s Supreme Court previously stated that a contract is one for insurance if: “it
meets the following test: one party, for compensation, assumes the risk of another;
the party who assumes the risk agrees to pay a certain sum of money on a specified
contingency; and the payment is made to the other party or the party's nominee.”161
Iowa’s Supreme Court noted “[i]n deciding whether a plan is insurance, its wording
is not controlling.”162 Iowa’s Barberton court acknowledged the court should:
look through the form of the transaction to determine whether the
relationship of insurer and insured exists. Whether the contract is one of
155

Id. KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(c) requires that the religious publication:

[a]ct[s] as an organizational clearinghouse for information between subscribers who
have financial, physical, or medical needs and subscribers who choose to assist with
those needs, matching subscribers with the present ability to pay with subscribers with
a present financial or medical need; …
KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(c) (West 2012).
156

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 282.
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Id.
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Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Insurance Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586
N.W.2d 352, 354 (Iowa 1998).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. (quoting Iowa Contractors Workers' Comp. Group v. Iowa Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 437
N.W.2d 909, 916 (Iowa 1989)).
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Id.
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insurance must be determined from its purpose, effect, content,
terminology, and conduct of the parties, and not from its designation
therein, since a contract which is fundamentally one of insurance cannot
be altered by the use or absence of words in the contract itself. The court
must look also to the intention of the parties in making this
determination.163
Iowa’s Insurance Division advanced two key arguments against Barberton’s
appeal. First, the Insurance Division argued CBN looked like insurance to the
average consumer.164 Iowa’s Supreme Court observed, “[d]espite this obvious
attempt to avoid insurance terminology, the insurance division says that the plan
should be subjected to its regulation.”165 “To use an old adage, if something looks
like a duck, quacks likes a duck, and walks like a duck, it must be a duck; this
program is insurance, according to the insurance division.”166 Analogously, the
Insurance Division noted “provisions in the plan, such as deductibles, exclusions,
coverage limitations, and monthly fees, which closely parallel provisions in
traditional health insurance policies.”167 The Insurance Division concluded that “[t]o
the average consumer, these features make the ‘Newsletter’ look like an insurance
policy.”168 Iowa’s Supreme Court reasoned, “[h]owever, even if a program looks like
insurance, it is not necessarily so.”169 The Iowa Supreme Court’s principal inquiry
here was “not how the program appears but whether the risk of payment for medical
expense is assumed by the promoter . . . [i]n fact, to be considered insurance, the
assumption of risk by the promoter must be the ‘principal object and purpose of the
program.’”170
Secondly, the Insurance Division focused on an implied assumption of risk. The
Insurance Division conceded CBN “expressly disavows any assumption of risk, but
it argues that some of its written material could be interpreted as a representation that
it would do so, thereby creating an implied agreement to assume health care
costs.”171 The Insurance Division pointed to several representations by CBN that it
believed “show an implied assumption of risk.”172 These representations were in a
163

Id. at 354-55 (quoting Iowa Contractors, 437 N.W.2d 909, 916, supra at n. 159 (further
citations omitted)).
164

Id at 354.
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Id. at 355.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.

170
Id. (quoting APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7002, at 14 (1981) (further
internal citations omitted)).
171

Id. (citing Irons v. Community State Bank, 461 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990)
(implying contract arising from conduct of parties)). The majority in Reinhold read MediShare’s commitment contract very much like Iowa’s Insurance Division here read CBN’s
representations – to create an implied assumption of risk where the HCSM specifically denies
any assumption of risk.
172

Id. at 355.
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form letter sent to CBN’s subscribers who had not received payments from other
subscribers and in the organization’s informational materials furnished to
prospective members.173 The form letters sent to subscribers stated: “[t]he home
office has paid for all members that have dropped our program this year. But if
someone does not pay we need that information in order for the home office to pay
for them.”174 In response, Iowa’s Supreme Court reasoned, “[t]his statement provides
only limited support for the division's position, however, because . . . the actual cost
is likely borne by another member.”175 The Barberton court reached this finding
because another form letter from CBN accompanied the checks for unmet needs
where a member did not pay.176 This second form letter indicated: “[a] new joiner is
filling their place and paying this need.”177 In addition, the Newsletter furnished the
following answers to general questions: “[q]uestion: WHAT HAPPENS IF
SOMEONE DOES NOT SEND THEIR GIFT?”178 CBN provided this answer: “[i]f
someone does not send their check, you alert the home office and we send them
three reminders. If they do not pay after the third reminder, they are dropped from
the program and the gift will be filled by a new member.”179 The Iowa Supreme
Court reasoned this material bore out the company’s non-assumption of risk.180
Iowa’s Insurance Division also relied on other “frequently asked questions” in
the Newsletter’s informational material, and argued the following was an implied
promise to pay:181
[q]uestion: WHAT AM I PROMISED FROM THE BROTHERHOOD?
Nothing, but in the last 10 years all needs that qualified [and were]
submitted to the Brotherhood for publication [have] had a 100%
response.182
Iowa’s Supreme Court disagreed: “[t]he company's statement does not promise to
pay anything from its own funds. In any event, any payment by the company for a
shortfall would be rare.”183 In addition, subscribers to the Newsletter had an amazing
non-payment rate of only one-half of one percent.184 The Supreme Court observed
that “even if the company paid one-half of one percent of the claims, any assumption
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Id. at 355-56.
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Id. (emphasis in original).

178

Id.

179
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of risk that small could not be the ‘principal object and purpose’ of the agreement as
required for it to be insurance.”185
Iowa’s Supreme Court opined, “[t]his is a case in which the insurance division
seeks to superimpose on all agreements an assumption of risk that is expressly
disavowed by the agreement itself.”186 The Iowa court concluded the Newsletter’s
plan “is not insurance,”187 and held that Iowa’s Insurance Division “failed to
establish the key element of insurance, the assumption of risk.”188 As Iowa’s
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s ruling on the above grounds, the Court
found it is unnecessary to consider whether Iowa’s statutory exemption for religious
publications applied.189
VI. HOW SHOULD COURTS AND S TATE REGULATORS T REAT HCSMS?
This Article now turns to examine how courts and state insurance regulators
should treat HCSMs and argues that HCSMs should be treated as follows.
•

•

•

•

First, courts and insurance regulators must recognize the legal
problems that crop up when one equates HCSMs with insurance,
evident in the Reinhold majority opinion.
Second, courts and insurance regulators must recognize the
logical problems that occur when one equates an HCSM with
insurance, also evident in the Reinhold majority opinion.
Third, given the general dearth of case law on HCSMs,190 when
faced with these issues, courts and insurance regulators should
apply HCSM “safe harbor” statutes and standard insurance law.
Fourth, courts and insurance regulators should protect HCSMs
and their members under the freedom of religion, the freedom to
contract, and the separation of powers doctrine. Courts and
insurance regulators should defer to state Attorney General
supervision of HCSMs as non-profit charitable organizations. In
addition, PPACA’s definition of health care sharing ministries
most likely preempts state legislative definitions to the contrary.

A. Recognize the Legal Difficulties of Equating HCSMs with Insurance
So, how should courts legally treat HCSMs? First and foremost, courts should
recognize the legal distinction between a definitional HCSM and definitional
insurance. Over 40% of the states define HCSMs in some way and exempt them
185

Id. (citing APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 7002, at 14 (1981) (further internal
citations omitted)).
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Id. (emphasis original).
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Id. at 357.
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Id. at 356-57.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 353-54 (this dearth of case law evidently is by design. CBN’s contract requires
the subscribers to agree, “I have no legal recourse against any subscriber or the publisher,
even if I do not receive any money for needs of mine submitted for publication in the
newsletter.”).
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from insurance regulations.191 As is evident from Virginia and Kentucky’s “safe
harbor” statutes, these religious publication statutes define HCSMs quite differently
from insurance.192 When a court fails to recognize the differences between an HCSM
and insurance, problems arise. There are a number of legal problems with the
Reinhold majority’s legal rationale.
First, the foundational legal problem in Reinhold’s majority opinion lies in the
omission of any reference to the legal standards governing the interpretation of
insurance contracts. If Medi-Share’s commitment contract is a type of insurance, the
Kentucky Supreme Court should have construed the Medi-Share commitment
contract according to the law governing the interpretation of insurance contracts.
Kentucky construes insurance contracts with these standards of law:
[t]erms of insurance contracts have no technical meaning in law and are to
be interpreted according to the usage of the average man and as they
would be read and understood by him in the light of the prevailing rule
that uncertainties and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the
insured. But this ‘rule of strict construction against an insurance company
certainly does not mean that every doubt must be resolved against it and
does not interfere with the rule that the policy must receive a reasonable
interpretation consistent with ... the plain meaning and/or language in the
contract.’ When the terms of an insurance contract are unambiguous and
not unreasonable, they will be enforced.193
The Reinhold majority apparently disregarded these laws of interpretation when
it decided that Medi-Share’s “process” constituted insurance. First, the Reinhold
court did not interpret Medi-Share’s commitment contract “according to the usage of
the average man,”194 as it “would be read and understood by him.” The “average
man” here should not be the average insurance purchaser. Rather, the “average
man” must be a Medi-Share member, who voluntarily agreed in the Medi-Share
commitment contract “that Christian Care Ministry (CCM) matches a Medi-Share
member’s medical need with other Members who have volunteered, in faith, to share
in meeting needs through the biblical concept of Christian mutual sharing.”195
Secondly, the Reinhold court did not give the commitment contract “a reasonable
interpretation consistent with . . . the plain meaning and/or language in the
contract.”196 How would “the usage of the average man” give a “reasonable
interpretation” of the plain meaning of Medi-Share’s disclaimer?

191

See infra Appendix B; see also, What is a Health Care Sharing Ministry?, THE
ALLIANCE OF HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES, http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm
(providing a brief description and key features of an HCSM).
192

See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6300 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6301 (2008); KY. REV.
ST. ANN. § 301.1-120(7)(d) (West 2012).
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Kentucky Ass'n of Cntys All Lines Fund Trust v. McClendon, 157 S.W.3d 626, 630
(Ky. 2005) (citations omitted) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id.
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Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Ky. 2010).
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McClendon, 157 S.W.3d at 630.
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ATTENTION – This publication does not guarantee or promise that your
medical bills will be published or assigned to others for payment.
Whether anyone chooses to pay your medical bills is strictly voluntary.197
The meaning of this language is plain, unless a court seeks to find an assumption
of risk and obligation where Medi-Share’s contract language expressly disavows
such.198 Thirdly, in order to evade enforcing the Medi-Share contract as written, the
Reinhold majority impliedly found the Medi-Share contract ambiguous and
unreasonable. If Medi-Share indeed functions as a type of insurance, why did the
Reinhold majority neglect to interpret Medi-Share’s contract according to standard
law governing the interpretation of insurance contracts? Further, if Medi-Share’s
contract was ambiguous and uncertain, the Kentucky Supreme Court certainly did
not resolve those difficulties in favor of the alleged insureds – Medi-Share’s
members who voluntarily agreed to Medi-Share’s contract. The bottom line is the
Reinhold majority ignored the plain meaning of the Medi-Share contract – a contract
that requires the conclusion reached by the Reinhold dissent and by Kentucky’s
Court of Appeals: Medi-Share is not insurance.199 In conclusion, courts should give
effect to HCSM member agreements and construe these agreements according to
standard contract law.
The second legal problem – and it springs from the first – lies with the majority’s
failure to explain exactly how the language of “the commitment contract . . .
obligates Medi-Share members to pay their monthly share.”200 Pollock’s century-old
observation is right on target: “[a]n unfortunate habit has arisen of using ‘obligation’
in a lax manner as co-extensive with duties of every kind.”201 Black’s Dictionary
defines obligation as “[a] legal or moral duty to do or not do something.”202 The
Medi-Share commitment contract requires members to agree: “all money comes
from the voluntary giving of Members.”203 Further, Medi-Share’s disclaimer states,
“[t]his publication does not guarantee or promise that your medical bills will be
published or assigned to others for payment. Whether anyone chooses to pay your
medical bills is strictly voluntary.”204 In other words, Medi-Share members agree
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Id.
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Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Ins. Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586
N.W.2d 352, 356 (Iowa 1998) (in the words of the Iowa Supreme Court: “this is a case in
which the insurance division seeks to superimpose on all agreements an assumption of risk
that is expressly disavowed by the agreement itself”).
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See Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 280 (Scott, J., dissenting).
Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
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BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST
BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 82 (1896)).
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BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (8th ed. 2004).

203

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d. at 274.

204

Id.

2013]

HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRIES

245

their monthly share is either a strictly voluntary or a moral obligation, not a legal
obligation or contractual guarantee.205
The Reinhold majority, however, reasoned that the contract obligated members to
pay their monthly share because fellow believers in Christ “rely on that payment.”206
The majority’s appeal to fellow believers relying on payment does not suggest a
legal obligation, but rather a moral obligation. If the commitment contract features a
legal obligation to assume the risk, then Medi-Share should have the right to compel
members to pay shares when there is a shortfall. However, the Reinhold majority
never suggested that Medi-Share’s contract is legally enforceable for that purpose. If
the majority construed the commitment contract as its stands, they would give effect
to the plain language that disavows any guarantee of payment, rather than importing
a non-existent member “obligation” through the presence of the word “rely.” Thus,
the Reinhold majority’s reasoning is unclear.
Perhaps the Kentucky Supreme Court considered Medi-Share’s commitment
contract somewhat like a promissory estoppel, based on detrimental reliance.207 In a
promissory estoppel action, detrimental reliance serves as a substitute for
consideration.208 However, the legal doctrine of consideration often denies
“enforcement to a promise to make a gift.”209 Medi-Share’s members promise to
205

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 202 (defining a moral obligation as, “[a] duty
that is based only on one’s conscience and that is not legally enforceable; an obligation with a
purely moral basis, as opposed to a legal one”).
206

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 277.

207
McCarthy v. Louisville Cartage Co., 796 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (citing THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1965)) (“[a] promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.”).
208

Id. at 12, citing CALAMARI AND PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, ch.6, § 99-§ 105
(Hornbook Series, 1970) (“[n]umerous oral and gratuitous promises have been enforced on
this basis”).
209

THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 90 cmt. f (1981) (comment f explains:
“[s]uch a promise is ordinarily enforced by virtue of the promisee's reliance only if his
conduct is foreseeable and reasonable and involves a definite and substantial change of
position which would not have occurred if the promise had not been made.”). Here, the
doctrine of consideration would deny legal enforcement of Medi-Share’s members’ voluntary
choice, or “obligation” to make a gift of their “share.” First, if some Medi-Share members
relied on other members’ promises to make a voluntary gift, their conduct, perhaps
foreseeable, would not be reasonable. Medi-Share members specifically agree: “I understand
that . . . other Members . . . have volunteered, in faith, to share in meeting needs through the
biblical concept of Christian mutual sharing. I further understand that all money comes from
the voluntary giving of Members . . . .” Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278. How would members
reasonably rely on other members’ promises, when Medi-Share’s disclaimer states: “Whether
anyone chooses to pay your medical bills is strictly voluntary.” How could reliance be
reasonable when Medi-Share’s disclaimer warns: “Whether or not you receive any payments
for medical expenses and whether or not this publication continues to operate, you are
responsible for payment of your own medical bills?” Second, there can be no “definite and
substantial change of position” if Medi-Share’s members are the ones ultimately “responsible
for payment of your own medical bills.” Simply, if the theory of promissory estoppel or
detrimental reliance lurked behind the Reinhold majority rationale, the facts simply do not
support that theory.
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make voluntary gifts and the doctrine of consideration should deny legal
enforcement of an HCSM member’s “promise” to make a gift. In essence, the
Reinhold majority imported this member obligation based upon reliance into the
Medi-Share contract. The contract specifically denies this type of member
obligation.210 The court’s very loose reading of the Medi-Share contract underscores
the first lesson: courts must give legal effect to the language of HCSM member
contracts.
A third legal problem with the Reinhold majority lies in a failure to explain just
how a “process” could “clearly” shift the risk of payment. Kentucky law requires
the contract to shift the risk. Insurance is “a contract whereby one undertakes to pay
or indemnify another as to loss from certain specified contingencies or perils called
‘risks,’ . . . .”211 The Reinhold majority reasoned, “[i]n return for paying their
monthly “share,” Medi-Share members remain eligible to receive payment for their
medical needs through the program.”212 Then, the majority declared, “[t]his process
clearly shifts the risk of payment for medical expenses from the individual member
to the pool of sub-accounts from which his expenses will be paid.”213 The majority
failed to explain just how a process morphs into an insurance contract. Unlike a
contractual shifting of risk, Medi-Share’s “process” is a clearinghouse system by
which the ministry distributes the members’ voluntary gifts.214 Simply, how can this
process shift risks to a “pool of sub-accounts” when the members have no
contractual obligation “to pay or indemnify another as to loss,” but only a voluntary,
moral obligation?
The fourth legal problem consists in the Reinhold majority’s failure to identify
the insurer in the Medi-Share’s alleged insurance “process.” In Kentucky, the word
“‘[i]nsurer’ includes every person engaged as principal and as indemnitor, surety, or
contractor in the business of entering into contracts of insurance.”215 Kentucky’s
statutory definition of insurance requires the insurer to “undertake[] to pay or
indemnify” the insured.216 However, the majority believed Medi-Share’s process
“shifts risk of payment . . . from the individual member to the pool of sub-accounts .
. . .”217 The majority believed the individual members “distribute[d] the risk of major
medical bills amongst each other.”218 However, Kentucky’s definition of “insurer”
does not include “the pool of sub-accounts” or the “individual members” of a
HCSM. The majority’s reasoning raises a few questions, which follow:
•

First, are Medi-Share’s individual members now “insurers”
under the Reinhold majority opinion? Under Kentucky’s

210

Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 278.
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KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-030 (West 2012) (emphasis added).
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definition of “insurer,” Medi-Share’s individual members are not
“engaged as principal . . . or contractor in the business of
entering into contracts of insurance.”219 This conclusion does
not legally follow.
Second, is Medi-Share as an organization the “insurer” under the
Reinhold majority opinion? The majority did not conclude MediShare was the insurer. The majority stated, “[t]he conclusion that
Medi–Share functions not as a charity, but as a type of insurance
is well supported by the evidence in the record.”220 In what
sense could Medi-Share as an organization “function . . . as a
type of insurance?” Kentucky law defines insurance as a
contract, not an organization, and not as a function or process.221
Third, did the Reinhold majority decision create a new type of
insurance? It appears that with Medi-Share’s “process” based
“insurance,” insurance exists without an insurer, at least in
Kentucky. Does any type of insurance exist that distributes the
risk amongst policyholders (or Medi-Share members), but does
not shift the risk of payment to Medi-Share, the alleged
“insurer?” The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reasoned, “[i]nsurance . . . involves distribution of the
risk, but distribution without assumption hardly can be held to be
insurance. These are elemental conceptions and controlling
ones.”222 Thus, insurance normally consists of five elements: “1)
[a]n insurable interest; 2) [a] risk of loss; 3) [a]n assumption of
risk by the insurer; 4) [a] general scheme to distribute the loss
among the larger group of persons bearing similar risks” and “5)
[t]he payment of a premium for the assumption of risk.”223 The
Reinhold majority focused on one element: the distribution of the
risk.224 It is noteworthy what the majority did not find in MediShare’s process: Medi-Share as an “insurer” does not assume the
risk, and Medi-Share’s members do not pay a premium for MediShare to assume the risk.
Fourth, does Kentucky’s new “process” type of insurance also
“perhaps” shield Medi-Share, the insurer, from any liability for
the “insured’s” medical bills? The Reinhold majority grudgingly
acknowledged Medi-Share’s disclaimer “perhaps” shields the
HCSM from “any liability for its members’ medical bills.”225
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App. 1975) (citing W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE § 1, at 2 (2d ed. 1930).
224

See Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 276-278.

225

Id. at 277.

248

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 26:219

However, the Reinhold majority ignored the effect of MediShare’s disclaimer, as the dissent charged.226 Whether MediShare’s disclaimer does shield the HCSM from liability for its
members’ medical bills, or only “perhaps” shields Medi-Share
from liability for such, Medi-Share’s need-sharing process
“hardly can be held to be insurance.”227
In conclusion, the legal problems noted above will be manifest when a court or
administrative officer seeks to squeeze an HCSM into the relevant definition of
insurance. These legal problems lead to certain logical problems, which this Article
turns to now.
B. Recognize the Logical Difficulties Of Equating HCSMs with Insurance
Now, how should courts logically treat HCSMs? This Article argues that courts
should apply the basic laws of logic to HCSM cases. The Reinhold majority opinion
ably demonstrates the logical briar patches awaiting when a court overlays the
definition of insurance on an HCSM. The first briar patch features the logical fallacy
of equivocation, which occurs when one reasons, “just because the same word or
form of the same word is used in two different contexts, it must mean the same thing
in both contexts.”228 The Reinhold majority took a description of Medi-Share’s
escrow account system and equivocated that with the definition of insurance, so:
“Medi-Share ‘undertakes’ to actually pool the members' monthly ‘shares’ together
and pay the actual medical bills as claims for payment are submitted.”229 First, when
a HCSM “undertakes” to “pay,” it does not mean the same thing as in an insurance
company undertakes to pay medical bills. HCSMs pay medical bills from member
shares; insurance companies pay medical bills from their own cash reserves.230
Second, on a more basic level, pooling member shares in escrow-type accounts and
paying medical bills from those accounts is simply not part of Kentucky’s definition
of insurance. With this, the majority of Kentucky’s Supreme Court essentially rewrote Kentucky’s statutory definition of insurance. This highlights an obvious
question – if the court had to equivocate and effectively re-write the definition of
insurance in order for a HCSM to be found “insurance,” shouldn’t the opposite
conclusion be reached?
In another example of equivocation, the Reinhold majority’s recitation of the
facts referred to Medi-Share’s trust sub-accounts as “sub-accounts designated by
individual member;” “another member’s sub-account;” “member sub-accounts;”
“individual sub-account[s];” and twice as “his sub-account.”231 The majority even
226

Id. at 277-78.
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Jordan, 107 F.2d at 245.
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Regester v. Longwood Ambulance Co., Inc., 751 A.2d 694, 700 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000); see also, State v. Star Enter., 691 So. 2d 1221, 1226 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (defining the
logical fallacy of equivocation as “an argument in which one term, in this case “exemption,” is
used with differences of meaning, often very subtle”).
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described the “sub-accounts function[ing] in many ways like an escrow account.”232
However, in the legal analysis, the Reinhold majority opinion never described MediShare’s trust sub-accounts as “individual sub-accounts,” or “sub-accounts designated
by individual member,” but instead characterized these accounts as “the pool of subaccounts.”233 Somehow, Medi-Share’s individual trust accounts lost their individual
status between the recitation of the facts and the opinion. The majority stated that
Medi-Share “pool[s] the members' monthly ‘shares’” and further, Medi-Share’s
“individual members pool resources together.”234 The Reinhold majority never
explained exactly how “sub-accounts designated by individual member” that
function “like an escrow account” could morph subtly into this “pool of subaccounts” – a pool that entirely escaped mention in the majority’s recitation of the
facts. Indeed, if Medi-Share places member gifts directly into “sub-accounts
designated by individual member,” like escrow accounts, it would seem Medi-Share
actually would meet every part of Kentucky’s Religious Publication statute, as the
Reinhold dissent maintained.
The second briar patch involves the logical fallacy of composition. This logical
fallacy occurs when one infers that what is true of the parts is therefore also true of
the whole.235 The Kentucky Court of Appeals elsewhere stated this fallacy:
“[b]ecause the atoms of this book are invisible, the book must be invisible.”236 In
essence, the Reinhold majority reasoned that because Medi-Share’s members assume
the risk, Medi-Share as an entity assumes the risk. The majority committed the
fallacy of composition by equating Medi-Share’s members with the singular “one”
who “undertakes to pay or indemnify another.”237 Kentucky defines insurance as: “a
contract whereby one undertakes to pay or indemnify another as to loss from certain
specified contingencies or perils called ‘risks,’ . . . .”238 Reinhold’s majority opined:
“Medi-Share's members “undertake[] to pay or indemnify another as to loss from
certain specified contingencies or perils called ‘risks'.”239 Yet, concerning the
members, Medi-Share’s contract states: “all money comes from the voluntary giving
232
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See, e.g., Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1469 (9th Cir.1994) (Trott, C.J., concurring and
dissenting):
[t]hird, the fallacy of composition is mischievously at work insofar as each
emasculated and quarantined piece of the whole is used to compel an adulterated and
invalid conclusion. If this were a proper way to reason, which it manifestly is not, one
could easily make the case that World War II wasn't really a significant threat to our
national security, just as the majority opinion claims Chew's behavior that afternoon
did not pose an “ immediate safety threat to anyone.”
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A & A Mech., Inc. v. Thermal Equip. Sales, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 505, 514 n.6 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1999) (“[l]ogicians refer to such invalid inferences from parts to whole as the fallacy of
composition: Because the atoms of this book are invisible, the book must be invisible.”).
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of Members . . . .”240 Further: “[w]hether anyone chooses to pay your medical bills
is strictly voluntary.”241 Concerning Medi-Share, the contract states: “I further
understand that all money comes from the voluntary giving of Members, not from
the Christian Care Ministry, and that the Christian Care Ministry is not liable for the
payment of any medical bills . . . .”242 The Reinhold dissent and majority believed
Medi-Share’s members assumed the risk. However, the majority’s conclusion – that
Medi-Share functions as a type of insurance – does not follow. Thus, what the
majority believed was true of Medi-Share’s members (the parts) – that they assumed
the risk – is not therefore also true of Medi-Share (the whole).243
The third briar patch features the fallacy of special pleading, which is “[a]n
argument that is unfairly slanted toward the speaker’s viewpoint because it omits
unfavorable facts or authorities and develops only favorable ones.”244 The Reinhold
majority simply omitted nearly all the unfavorable facts and authorities and
developed only the arguments sufficient to reach their desired conclusion, thus
committing this logical fallacy. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, in an analogous situation, described this fallacy as “looking only at the
risk element, to the exclusion of all others present or their subordination to it.”245 In
particular, why was the Reinhold majority unwilling to acknowledge the legal effect
of Medi-Share’s disclaimer and Medi-Share’s substantial compliance with
Kentucky’s religious publication statute? The majority reluctantly admitted when
saying that, “[t]his disclaimer, while perhaps shielding Medi–Share from any
liability for its members' medical bills . . . .”246 The Reinhold dissent pointed this
out: “the majority discards this disclaimer under the guise that Medi-Share's function
overrides the contract language.”247 The dissent then impliedly charged the majority
with rendering the religious publication statute that required the disclaimer a
240
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Apply the majority’s reasoning to standard insurance. It highlights the logical
difficulties. The purchasers of insurance, (the parts) the “insured[s]” do not “undertake[] to
pay or indemnify another as to loss . . . .” Id. at 278. Rather, it is insurance companies (the
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looking only at the risk element, to the exclusion of all others present or their subordination to
it. The question turns, not on whether risk is involved or assumed, but on whether that or
something else to which it is related in the particular plan is its principal object and
purpose.”).
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And while I believe that an insurance company may not disclaim its insurance
function simply by employing a disclaimer in its policies, I also recognize that the
General Assembly, in passing this statute, considers the disclaimer more pertinent
than a normal one used by a non-religious institution. Otherwise, subsection (f)
becomes superfluous, and will be read as an irrelevant section of Kentucky law. Id.
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superfluous and irrelevant section of Kentucky law.248 Medi-Share’s disclaimer
states:
ATTENTION—This publication is not issued by an insurance company,
nor is it offered through an insurance company. This publication does not
guarantee or promise that your medical bills will be published or assigned
to others for payment. Whether anyone chooses to pay your medical bills
is strictly voluntary. This publication should never be considered a
substitute for an insurance policy. Whether or not you receive any
payments for medical expenses and whether or not this publication
continues to operate, you are responsible for payment of your own
medical bills.249
Medi-Share’s disclaimer – one the Kentucky legislature requires such health care
sharing ministries to publish prominently250 – simply knocks out the Reinhold
majority’s apparent straw man member that “relies” on other member’s obligation.
Indeed, the majority’s argument “is unfairly slanted” toward their “viewpoint
because it omits unfavorable facts or authorities and develops only favorable
ones.”251
The fourth and last logical briar patch features the fallacy of guilt by
association.252 The Reinhold majority committed this fallacy by citing certain
egregious examples from insurance case law and comparing them with HCSMs.253
The fallacy occurs by reasoning that if HCSMs “hang out” with insurance scams,
then HCSMs must be insurance scams.254 Admittedly, employing this fallacy makes
the legal analysis concerning HCSMs easier and shorter. However, arguing for guilt
by association does not properly bring HCSMs under the laws of insurance, just as
hanging out in a crack house does not thereby a drug dealer make.255
The Kentucky Supreme Court cited law256 from Allin v. Motorists’ Alliance of
America, where the question was whether “the contract . . . constitute[s] the business
of insurance . . . .”257 The Alliance solicited auto owners to enter into contracts in
which the Alliance promised to provide for the costs of certain legal services.258 The
Alliance agreed to provide legal services for charges such as manslaughter, reckless
248
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evidence was presented in an effort to inflame the jury, and convict Walker of guilt by
association. He was hanging out in a “crack house,” therefore he must be a drug dealer.”).
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driving, collisions, and personal injury.259 However, the contract disclaimer stated:
“[t]his contract is not one of indemnity or insurance . . . .”260 The Allin appellee
pointed out that “the contract . . . states . . . it is not an insurance policy.”261 The
Kentucky Court of Appeals responded, “[n]o one can change the nature of insurance
business by declaring in the contract that it is not insurance.”262 The court further
observed, “[i]t is not good logic to argue that the furnishing of an attorney to
represent the owner of an automobile in his defense in court actions is not a loss
indemnified against. Insurance companies are authorized to indemnify against such
losses . . . .”263 In short, “no one would argue that it was not insurance.”264 The
Allin court determined “the provision of the contract to provide for services of an
attorney, free of charge upon the happening of certain contingencies, is insurance . . .
.”265 The Allin court believed “[t]he essential purpose” of “the contract in
controversy” was “not to render personal services, but to indemnify against loss and
damage resulting from the defense of actions.”266
The Reinhold court also cited the particularly egregious case of Wheeler v. Ben
Hur Life Association,267 where Kentucky’s Court of Appeals considered “whether
the Association was in effect an insurance company . . . .”268 The Association had
been licensed as a fraternal benefit society exempt from Kentucky’s insurance
laws.269 The Wheeler court noted, however, that “the law looks at substance instead
of form, and is not deceived by the gloss of words.”270 The Association provided for
a lodge system, ritualistic forms of work, and a representative form of government;
had no capital stock; and organized ostensibly for the benefit of its members.271
However, the Association had “been engaged in the life insurance business” while
giving only superficial attention to lodge requirements.272 The agents received
salaries and commissions on premiums; commissions were based on sales, not the
259

Id. at 20-21.

260
Id. at 21. The disclaimer continued: “and this Alliance is not responsible for any court
costs or damages recovered against the owner or expenses incurred in connection with the
litigation, except the services of the Alliance's attorney.” Id.
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as stated in Subtitle 29.” KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1-120 (West 2012).
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number of members procured; the Association’s efforts were directed toward selling
insurance, not recruiting members; and the Association placed little emphasis on
lodge membership.273 The Association performed their “ritualistic work . . .
perfunctorily.”274 No members had been initiated since 1941; lodge meetings were
held without notice; and the lodge conducted little or no solicitation of social
members and desired only insured members.275 The Kentucky Court of Appeals
concluded that “the primary function of the Ben Hur Life Association is to sell
insurance, and that the Association was an insurance company operating under the
guise of a fraternal benefit society.”276
The essential facts of Allin and Wheeler differ significantly from Reinhold. In
Allin, the “Alliance” specifically agreed to provide for the costs of legal services if a
member faced certain charges.277 In contrast, Medi-Share as an organization agrees
to provide no payment when Medi-Share subscribers face certain medical costs.278
The “commitment” contract obligates Medi-Share to provide certain services to its
members, but not indemnification or payment.279 Thus, the facts of Allin require the
opposite conclusion: Medi-Share promises or guarantees no payment; therefore,
Medi-Share is not insurance. The Ben Hur Life Association in the Wheeler case is a
false analogy to Medi-Share, which was engaged in all of its statutorily required
duties as a HCSM under Kentucky’s “Religious Publication” statute, save one. In
contrast, the Ben Hur Life Association in Wheeler was only superficially engaged in
its statutorily required duties as a fraternal lodge.280 Under these facts, the Reinhold
majority would be hard pressed to maintain “the primary function of [Medi-Share] is
to sell insurance, and that [Medi-Share] was an insurance company operating under
the guise of a [health care sharing ministry].”281
In sum, if the law looks at substance instead of form,282 then Medi-Share in
substance is a HCSM under Kentucky law, not an insurance company. Not only do
cases like Allin and Wheeler invoke the fallacy of guilt by association, such cases are
a red herring, a logical distraction from the real legal issues involved in cases on
HCSMs.283 The substantive legal issue for HCSMs is whether the ministry complies
with the applicable “safe harbor” statute under state law which this Article examines
below in §4.B.2. In conclusion, the laws of logic should not be somehow suspended
for court cases and administrative actions regarding HCSMs. The Reinhold majority
273
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opinion contains several examples of the defective logic involved in trying to equate
an HCSM within the definition of insurance, and both the courts and state regulators
would do well to avoid such logical thickets.
C. What to Do With the Dearth of Case Law on HCSMs
The general dearth of case law on HCSMs means the Kentucky Supreme Court
dealt with HCSMs by making analogies to certain egregious cases involving other
agencies, as noted above. Interestingly, the Reinhold majority did cite Iowa’s
Barberton case, the only other reported case on point.284 The Reinhold majority did
not distinguish Barberton’s holding or explain why the Reinhold case required the
opposite result. However, no other reported cases deal with the specific issues of
whether HCSMs are engaged in the business of insurance and whether the “safe
harbor” statute applies.285 In order to deal with this lack of case law, this Article first
examines precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, secondly argues that courts
should apply the “safe harbor” statutes to HCSMs, and lastly offers some analysis on
whether HCSMs should be compared to other types of organizations to determine
whether HCSMs are insurance, as the Kentucky Supreme Court did.
1. Some Guidance from U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
The assumption of the risk is a key element for insurance.286 The key question
here is, given the fact HCSMs specifically disclaim any assumption of the risk,
whether HCSM members indeed assume the risk of payment of medical costs among
themselves. However, while the assumption of risk is a key element, it is not the
only element of insurance.287 Three U.S. Supreme Court precedents in the area of
insurance law provide helpful guidance for cases beyond the borders of Iowa and
Kentucky.
First, the U.S. Supreme Court defined insurance as “an arrangement for
transferring and distributing risk” in Group Life & Health Company v. Royal Drug
Company.288 In Group Life, certain pharmacists alleged some pharmacy agreements
violated the Sherman Act.289 The question was whether these pharmacy agreements
were the “business of insurance.”290 The Group Life Court stated, “[t]he primary
elements of an insurance contract are the spreading and underwriting of a
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looking only at the risk element, to the exclusion of all others present or their subordination to
it. The question turns, not on whether risk is involved or assumed, but on whether that or
something else to which it is related in the particular plan is its principal object and
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policyholder's risk.”291 The court explained, “[i]t is characteristic of insurance that a
number of risks are accepted, some of which involve losses, and that such losses are
spread over all the risks so as to enable the insurer to accept each risk at a slight
fraction of the possible liability upon it.”292 The Court further explained, “[t]he
Pharmacy Agreements thus do not involve any underwriting or spreading of risk . . .
they are not the “business of insurance.”293
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court provided a more complete definition of “the
business of insurance” in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts.294 Three
relevant criteria indicate whether a particular practice falls within “the business of
insurance:”
(1) whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder's risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and (3) whether
the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.295
Third, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Company, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether variable annuities
were “contracts for insurance.”296 Variable annuity benefit payments vary with the
success of the investment.297 The annuitant “cannot look forward to a fixed monthly
or yearly amount.”298 Variable annuities share characteristics with fixed annuities,
including periodic payments continuing until the annuitant’s death or the end of a
fixed term.299 Issuers “assume the risk of mortality . . . an actuarial prognostication
that a certain number of annuitants will survive to specified ages.”300 The annuity
contract reflects the mortality prediction, which is a risk “assumed both by
respondents and by those who issue fixed annuities.”301 The “[r]espondents . . . urge
[this feature] . . . is basically an insurance device.”302 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed: “absent some guarantee of fixed income, the variable annuity places all
the investment risks on the annuitant, none on the company.”303 The Court
concluded, “the concept of ‘insurance’ involves some investment risk-taking on the
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Id. (quoting 1 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 1:3 (2d ed., 1959)).

293

Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 214.

294

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985).

295

Id.

296

Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S 65, 68 (1959).

297

Id. at 69.

298

Id. at 70.

299

Id.

300

Id.

301

Id.

302

Id.

303

Id. at 71.

256

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 26:219

part of the company.” 304 The variable annuity companies guaranteed “nothing to the
annuitant except an interest in a portfolio of common stocks . . . .”305 Further,
“[t]here is no true underwriting of risks, the one earmark of insurance . . . .”306
Analyzing these cases with respect to HCSMs reveals several things. First,
HCSMs as organizations lack the primary element of insurance under Group Life:
the underwriting of policyholder risk.307 HCSMs lack the “characteristic of
insurance” that enables “the insurer to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the
possible liability upon it.”308 The Reinhold dissent correctly pointed out “Medi-Share
takes no responsibility for the payment of the members' medical bills,” and thus
bears no liability or risk of loss.309 In other words, HCSMs do not underwrite
“policyholder risk.” Further, HCSMs do not “accept each risk at a slight fraction of
the possible liability upon it.” Rather, Medi-Share and other HCSMs do not have
even a fraction of possible liability for member medical bills, which are voluntarily
shared by other members and not by these HCSMs themselves.
Second, under Met Life, for courts to consider an HCSM the practice of
insurance, the HCSM has to have the effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder’s risk and the practice must be an “integral part” of the relationship
between the insurer and insured.310 The Reinhold dissent and the majority effectively
acknowledged Medi-Share’s cost-sharing contract “has the effect of … spreading a
policyholder’s risk.”311 Yet, the dissent noted Medi-Share’s assumption of risk did
not occur “between the insurer and the insured.”312 The majority also stated it was
the members, not Medi-Share, who “undertake[] to pay or indemnify another as to
loss from certain . . . ‘risks’.”313 Thus, under the Reinhold majority’s view of these
facts, Medi-Share’s contractual “spreading of the risk” cannot be said to be an
“integral part of the . . . policy relationship between the insurer and the insured.”
Thus, under the Met Life test, HCSMs do not fall within the “business of insurance.”
Third, under Variable Annuity, HCSMs may have some “aspect[s] of insurance”
– like variable annuities do.314 Yet, these aspects are apparent, not real; superficial,
not substantial, because HCSM contracts or member agreements have “no element
of fixed return” obligatory upon the ministry, much like variable annuities. HCSMs
are not involved in “investment risk-taking.” Much like variable annuities, HCSMs
essentially “guarantee nothing” to their members except the provision of certain
services as a clearinghouse for information on medical needs. Admittedly, CBN’s
304
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disavowal of any guarantees is much stronger worded than Medi-Share’s disavowal
of guarantees.315 Yet, there is no way to remain faithful to the language of these
HCSM contracts and arrive where the Reinhold majority did. In short, HCSMs
feature “no true underwriting of risks, the one earmark of insurance.”316 Much like
variable annuities, “in hard reality the issuer of a [HCSM commitment contract] that
has no element of fixed return assumes no true risk in the insurance sense.”317
2. Courts Should Apply the “Safe Harbor” HCSM Statutes
Courts can easily make a detailed list of the need-sharing “processes” HCSMs
engage in and from there maintain health care cost sharing constitutes the business of
insurance by focusing on a few aspects of HCSMs.318 Indeed, the Reinhold majority
315

CBN’s member agreement states:

I am not guaranteed payment for any need of mine that is published in the newsletter.
I participate voluntarily to practice Christian principles as the Bible teaches and to
contribute to others' needs. I agree that I have no legal recourse against any subscriber
or the publisher, even if I do not receive any money for needs of mine submitted for
publication in the newsletter.
Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v Ins. Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586 N.W. 2d
352, 353 (Iowa 1998). Medi-Share’s member commitment contract states:
[t]his publication does not guarantee or promise that your medical bills will be
published or assigned to others for payment. Whether anyone chooses to pay your
medical bills is strictly voluntary. ... Whether or not you receive any payments for
medical expenses and whether or not this publication continues to operate, you are
responsible for payment of your own medical bills.
Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Ky. 2010). Analogously, Samaritan
Ministries’ current member application states:
I agree that neither I nor Samaritan Ministries have any legal power to force anyone to
give to me for any need. Members give to other members voluntarily as an expression
of obedience to their Christian faith, and it would be contrary to my Christian beliefs
for any governmental authority to construe giving by members to be a contractual
obligation.
Membership Application, SAMARITAN MINISTRIES.ORG http://samaritanministries.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Member-App-201302.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
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Officer’s description of the CBN health-care sharing program:
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participation by subscribers. (3) It admits applicants to “membership” in the CBN
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or requests for payment, that is, for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by
participants in the CBN program. (6) CBN determines to what extent each application
for reimbursement is within its operating criteria and thus can be approved. (7) Upon
approval, CBN determines the total amount (of reimbursement) to be paid to a
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pointed out just a few ways Medi-Share held similarities with insurance.319 Instead,
courts should consider whether the HCSM complies with their own statutory
definition of HCSMs in a “safe harbor” statute.320 When viewed from this angle,
Medi-Share complied with Kentucky’s “religious publication” statute in total, with
only one exception.321 The Reinhold majority held, “[i]t is clear from the statutory
language of KRS 304.1–120(7) that for Medi-Share to qualify for the Religious
Publications Exception, it must meet every criterion listed322. . . . Medi-Share does
not.”323 The majority stated, “[e]ach ‘subscribers' needs’ are . . . not paid directly
from one subscriber to another, but through Medi-Share. Since Medi-Share does not
satisfy KRS 304.1–120(7)(d), it does not qualify for the Religious Publication
Exception.”324
However, the Reinhold majority did not point out any other subsection of K.R.S.
§ 304.1-120(7) that Medi-Share failed to comply with. Unlike the Ben Hur Life
Association’s inattention to its required fraternal duties in Wheeler, Medi-Share gave
much more than superficial attention to its HCSM duties.325 If the Kentucky
Reinhold majority had discussed and then applied Kentucky’s entire religious
member. (8) It allocates or assigns a specific amount of money to be paid by named
members and directs those members to send the specified amount to a named person.
(9) Upon arrival CBN advises the member seeking reimbursement that certain
designated members will send moneys to him/her. (10) If the member seeking
reimbursement does not receive, within three months, a check from a participant in the
program, in the amount which CBN had directed, the CBN provides a substitute for
the non-paying member. . . Consequently, given the liberal interpretation to be applied
to the Insurance Code, it is clear that CBN’s activities fall within those outlined in §§
505(a) & (d).
Id.
319
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[n]either do we doubt that [members of Medi-Share] pay “shares” with the expectation of a
financial return based on Medi–Share's history of claims payments in the form of the payment
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from Stephen Sullivan, Gen. Counsel for Christian Care Ministries, Inc., to Benjamin Boyd
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publication statute to Medi-Share, the majority should have observed that MediShare does the following things:
•

•

•

•
•
•

•

Medi-Share is a religious publication identified in K.R.S. §
304.1-120(7) that limits their operations to those activities
permitted by that statutory subsection.326
Medi-Share is a non-profit religious organization,327 limited to
subscribers who are members of the same denomination or
religion.328
Medi-Share acts as an organizational clearinghouse for
information between subscribers who have needs and subscribers
who choose to assist with those needs.329
Medi-Share matches subscribers with the present ability to pay
with subscribers with a present need.330
Medi-Share suggests amounts to give that are voluntary among
the subscribers.331
Medi-Share’s need-sharing has no assumption of risk or promise
to pay either among the subscribers or between the subscribers
and the publication.332
Lastly, Medi-Share provides the statutorily required disclosure
on their applications, guidelines, publications, and promotional
materials – which plainly states, “[t]his publication is not issued
by an insurance company nor is it offered through an insurance
company.”333

In short, if the Reinhold majority would consider and apply each part of
Kentucky’s religious publication statute to Medi-Share, the rationale for the majority
opinion would change along the following lines:
•

•

First, the majority would acknowledge that Medi-Share
functioned as a religious organization and charity, which they
apparently denied.334
Second, the majority would admit that Medi-Share functions as
an “organizational clearinghouse,” not an insurer, as they
maintained.335 How can Medi-Share function as “an

326

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120(7) (West 2012).

327

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(a).

328

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(b).

329

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(c); the Reinhold majority described Medi-Share as
an “intermediary,” but not as a “clearinghouse.” Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 279.
330

K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(c).

331

K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(e) (emphasis added).

332

K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(e).

333

K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(f).

334

K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7)(b); Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d at 279.

335

See Reinhold, 325 S.W3d at 279.
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intermediary” for purposes of being excluded from Kentucky’s
religious publication statute and at the same time somehow
function as “a type of insurance” for purposes of meeting
Kentucky’s definition of insurance?
Third, the majority would concede that Medi-Share as an
“organizational clearinghouse for information” should
“determine which needs are paid, how they are paid, and when
they are paid.”336 If an HCSM cannot “determine which needs
are paid, how they are paid, and when they are paid,” how can
HCSMs ever act as an “informational clearinghouse,” matching
subscribers who have needs and subscribers who assist with the
needs?337 In the words of the Reinhold dissent: “this delegation
and discretion is expressly contemplated by KRS 304.1–
120(7)(c) which recognizes and allows the administration of
these type of cost-sharing organizations . . .”338
Fourth, the majority would admit that Medi-Share only suggests
amounts to give that are “voluntary among the subscribers,” thus
negating Medi-Share’s members’ alleged “obligation” which
other members allegedly rely on, in spite of the contract
language.339
Fifth, the majority would concede that an assumption of risk or
promise to pay exists neither among the subscribers or between
the subscribers and the publication – thus, Medi-Share’s
members do not assume any risk or promise to pay anything –
and neither does Medi-Share. The fourth point, if acknowledged,
removes the key legal cornerstone from the Reinhold majority’s
holding.340
Sixth, the majority would acknowledge that Medi-Share
complied with Kentucky’s statutorily required disclaimer. Yet,
the Reinhold majority discarded “this disclaimer under the guise
that Medi-Share's function overrides the contract language . . .
.”341

336

Id.

337

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.1-120(7)(c) (West 2012).

338

Reinhold, 325 S.W3d at 283; see also Id. at 281 (”this type of management and
delegation of authority is contemplated in KRS § 304.1–120(7)(c) . . .”)
339

Id. at 278.

340

Id.

341
Id. at 280 n.1 (“[t]he General Assembly of Kentucky promulgated and requires this
disclaimer when religious institutions attempt to create these cost-sharing organizations . . . . I
also recognize that the General Assembly, in passing this statute, considers the disclaimer
more pertinent than a normal one used by a non-religious institution. Otherwise, subsection (f)
becomes superfluous, and will be read as an irrelevant section of Kentucky law.”)
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In conclusion, the Reinhold majority ignored Medi-Share’s substance as a HCSM
and emphasized Medi-Share’s minimal and superficial similarities to insurance.342
The majority simply failed to give due consideration to Medi-Share’s substantial
compliance with Kentucky statute as a religious publication statutorily exempt from
Kentucky’s insurance regulations. Going forward, courts should give due
consideration to whether the HCSM complies with its own statutory definition of
HCSMs in these “safe harbor” statutes, rather than cataloguing the ways the health
care sharing process may bear superficial similarities to insurance.
3. Should Courts Review other Analogous Case Law?
While case law regarding other organizations and practices can be instructive to a
degree, courts and insurance regulators should exercise caution when analogizing
HCSMs to other practices or agencies that courts have held to be insurance. Not
only is this type of legal reasoning sloppy logic,343 it is also relatively futile. The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declined to embark upon a
similar inquiry: “[n]o good purpose would be served by an extensive review of cases
dealing with multitudinous types of organization and function [sic] holding them to
be or not to be engaged in some form of insurance business.”344 The Court reasoned,
“[o]nly a very few deal with the specific issue presented here, namely, whether
consumer cooperatives are so engaged” in the business of insurance.345
Likewise, should future litigation arise over HCSMs, courts and insurance
regulators should confine themselves to the specific issues presented – the issues of
whether the HCSM in question complies with the applicable “safe harbor” statutory
exemption for HCSMs and whether HCSMs are indeed engaged in the business of
insurance. This Article now turns to consider five additional reasons why the states
should not regulate HCSMs as insurance.
VII. Some Final Considerations for Courts and State Insurance Regulators
A. The Freedom to Contract / Public Policy
First, HCSM agreements must receive legal protection under the freedom to
contract.346 Kentucky’s Supreme Court recognized the freedom to contract is
“safeguarded by the constitutional guaranty of ‘pursuit of happiness,’ so one has the
right to refuse to accept a contract or to assume such liability as may be
342
See also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65,
68 (1959) (where the variable annuities at issue had “an aspect of insurance. Yet it is apparent,
not real; superficial, not substantial. In hard reality the issuer of a variable annuity that has no
element of a fixed return assumes no true risk in the insurance sense.”)
343

See supra Part 4.A.2.

344

Jordan v. Group. Health Ass’n, 107 F.2d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (citing the
annotations in 63 A.L.R. 711 and 100 A.L.R. 1449, when faced with the question whether a
certain consumer cooperative was insurance).
345
346

Id.

See, e.g., Mullins v. Northern Ky. Inspections, Inc., No. 2009-CA-000067-MR, 2010
WL 3447630 at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2010) (citation omitted) (“the doctrine of freedom to
contract prevails and, in the absence of ambiguity, a written instrument will be enforced
strictly according to its terms.”)
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proposed.”347 The Reinhold majority overlooked the fact that competent adults
freely agreed to the Medi-Share agreement, which requires members to affirm they
have “volunteered, in faith, to share in meeting needs through the biblical concept of
Christian mutual sharing.”348 The acknowledgement continues: “I further understand
that all money comes from the voluntary giving of Members, not from the Christian
Care Ministry, and that the Christian Care Ministry is not liable for the payment of
any medical bills.”349
Simply, competent adults freely sign these “commitment contracts” and
“membership applications,” agreeing the HCSM is “not insurance” and agreeing to
meet the needs of others of faith voluntarily through the sharing ministry. If people
of faith seek their own “pursuit of happiness” and assume the obligations incumbent
upon HCSM members, they have “the right to refuse to accept a contract or to
assume such liability as may be proposed.”350 Strangely enough, HCSM members do
not want the supposed benefit of insurance regulations encumbering their particular
sharing ministry: “the consumers apparently needing the Department’s protection
seek an exemption from those regulations.”351 The HCSM members insurance
regulators seek to protect freely signed contracts that do not implicate the restrictions
of state insurance regulations. In such situations, both the courts and insurance
regulators should not deny people of faith the right to contract as they wish and
voluntarily share medical expenses.
Second, there are no public policy reasons to restrict HCSM member contracts
and force HCSMs into the mold of insurance companies. Kentucky’s Supreme
Court defined “public policy” as: “the principles under which freedom of contract
and private dealing are restricted by law for the good of the community.”352 Further,
“[c]ertain classes of contracts, though not prohibited by the Constitution or statutes,
are held by the courts to be against public policy on the ground that they promote
unfairness and injustice, and are therefore mischievous in their tendency, and
detrimental to the public good.”353 Do HCSMs promote unfairness or injustice? Are
HCSMs detrimental to the public good? Interestingly, Iowa’s Supreme Court in
Barberton noted as an aside that “[t]he evidence is uncontradicted that no member
complaints have been filed with the insurance division by any newsletter
members.”354 Further, in Reinhold, the Kentucky Attorney General’s office had
347
General Elec. Co. v. Am. Buyers Co-op., Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354, 354 (Ky. 1958)
(citations omitted) (Kentucky’s Supreme Court acknowledged that “[w]hile the term ‘freedom
of contract’ does not appear in the federal or state constitutions, it is always embraced in the
meaning of ‘liberty’ as employed in those instruments . . . .”)
348

Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272 at 274 (Ky. 2010).

349

Id.

350

General Elec. Co., 316 S.W.2d at 361.

351

In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003.
352
Central W. Cas. Co. v. Stewart, 58 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1933) (internal
citations omitted).
353
354

Id.

Barberton Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Insurance Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586
N.W.2d 352, 357 (Iowa 1998).
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investigated no complaints against Medi-Share when the case was at the trial court
level.355
Where there is no evidence of unfairness, injustice, mischievous tendencies, or
detriment to the public good, as with the Reinhold and Barberton cases, then, as a
matter of public policy, HCSM members’ freedom to contract should not be
restricted “for the good of the community.” Instead, as a matter of policy, HCSM
members must have the same freedom to contract as any other member of society.
Where government has a duty to uphold the public policy of protecting consumers
from potential scams or unscrupulous practices, the solution should not involve
equating HCSMs with insurance, as these ministries are not insurance. Applying
statutory regulations “designed to fit” insurance to the operations of cooperative
HCSM organizations “could not be other than incongruous, or fatal” to the
HCSMs.356 “It would result, not in regulation, but in destruction of the
organization.”357 Rather than destroying the voluntary, cooperative nature of HCSMs
by forcing HCSMs into insurance regulations, state legislatures may achieve the
general public policy goal of protecting consumers by requiring HCSMs to employ
statutory disclaimers in their advertising materials.358 State legislatures may also
further this public policy goal by enacting specific statutory “safe harbor”
exemptions from insurance regulations for HCSMs, as twenty-one states have done
to date.359
B. The Freedom of Religion
HCSMs and their members should receive protection from insurance regulations
under the constitutional freedom of religion. The three major HCSMs possess a
distinctly religious focus and explain this in different ways.
Reverend Howard Russell, president of the Christian Healthcare Ministry,
formerly CBN, stated the first health insurance policies surfaced around the
1920’s.360 In contrast to health insurance, Russell noted that Christians have been
sharing one another’s medical burdens for hundreds and hundreds of years.361 The
355
Roger Alford, Kentucky Churchgoers: Medi-Share Not an Insurance Program,
INSURANCE JOURNAL, Oct. 30, 2006, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast
/2006/10/30/73618.htm (last visited June 22, 2012) (Vicki Glass, spokeswoman for the
Kentucky Attorney General’s Office, said her office has investigated no complaints).
356
Jordan v. Group Health Ass’n, 107 F.2d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (regarding a certain
consumer cooperative which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found not to be insurance).
357

Id.

358
In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc. No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003 (Administrative Law Judge
Beck opined: “it appears that the explicit disclaimers used by CBN have avoided complaints
in the past, and presumably should do so in the future. The Department has not shown how a
warning would not suffice to meet its interest in protecting consumers and the public safety.”).
359

See infra Appendix B; see also The Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries, What is
a Health Care Sharing Ministry?, http://www.healthcaresharing.org/hcsm (last visited July 14,
2012).
360

Telephone Interview with Rev. Howard Russell, President, Christian Healthcare
Ministries (July 25, 2012).
361

Id.
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Christian Healthcare Ministry also asserts, “[t]he New Testament says Christians
should carry each other’s burdens. That is the foundation of our voluntary costsharing ministry.”362 Likewise, Medi-Share maintains it promotes religious and
biblical values because “[t]aking care of each other was a way of life for Christians
in the [early] days of the Church.”363 Medi-Share members seek to fulfill the Biblical
requirement, “[a]nd do not forget to do good and to share with others, for with such
sacrifices God is pleased.”364 Medi-Share explains this requirement so:
Christians continued to care for each other well into the twentieth century.
But after World War II, government programs and insurance companies
assumed the Church’s role as caretaker. When medical costs soared, many
churches found they lacked the resources to care for their members.
Christians view not-for-profit ministries like Medi-Share as a way to
reclaim their biblical mandate to care and provide for their brothers and
sisters in Christ.365
Samaritan Ministries International founded its HCSM on the principle that “God
is the ultimate Source of provision for every need encountered by the Christian.
Even when help comes through a person, it ultimately comes from God.”366
Samaritan Ministries embraces the principle that “[a] medical need cannot be met
with money alone. Prayer and encouragement are also needed.”367 Samaritan
Ministries believes “[i]t is the responsibility of those within the Body of Christ to
allow themselves to be used of God to help in meeting the needs of other
Christians.”368
While no reported cases on HCSMs deal with the freedom of religion,369 in 2003,
Minnesota Administrative Law Judge Greg Beck considered this argument as
362
Christian Healthcare Ministries, How it Works, CHRISTIAN HEALTHCARE MINISTRY,
http://www.chministries.org/howitworks.aspx (last visited on July 12, 2012) (referring to
Galatians 6:2).
363
Medi-Share, FAQs, MYCHRISTIANCARE.ORG, http://mychristiancare.org/MediShare/Public_Content/Medi-Share_FAQs.aspx#1q2 (last visited July 12, 2012).
364

Id. (quoting Hebrews 13:16).

365

Id.

366

Samaritan Ministries International, Foundational Principles, SAMARITAN MINISTRIES,
http://www.samaritanministries.org/principles/ (last visited July 12, 2012).
367

Id.

368

Id.

369
But see Christian Bhd. Newsletter v. Levinson, C.A. No. 92A-06-016 (Del. Super. Ct.
Feb. 4, 1993) (on file with author). Delaware’s Supreme Court implicitly addressed the
freedom of religion when that court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision in Christian Bhd.
Newsletter v. Levinson. See Christian Bhd. Newsletter v. Levinson, No. 103,1993 (Del. Aug.
3, 1993) (unpublished order), available at http://de.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer
.aspx/xq/fac.19930803_0004.DE.htm/qx. After finding CBN lacked standing to assert the
religious First Amendment rights of its subscribers, the Superior Court in dicta addressed the
applicability of the rule from Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-879 (1990).
Christian Bhd. Newsletter v. Levinson, C.A. No. 92A-06-016 at 10-11. “The right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law
of general applicability on the ground that law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that is
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applied to an HCSM.370 In 2001, Minnesota’s Commissioner of Commerce had
issued a Cease and Desist Order against the Christian Brotherhood Newsletter
[CBN], alleging “the newsletter was engaging in the business of insurance in
Minnesota without a license….”371 Two CBN subscribers, John and Lynne Cooke,
petitioned to intervene in the matter.372 The ALJ denied the Cooke’s petition, yet
allowed them to file a memorandum in support of CBN’s Motion for Summary
Disposition.373 Ultimately, Judge Beck’s recommendation both rescinded the Cease
and Desist Order and granted CBN’s Motion for Summary Disposition.374
It is important to note how Judge Beck dealt with this important legal issue for
HCSMs as an example of how courts should respect HCSM members’ freedom of
religion. In this administrative matter, both CBN and the Cookes argued that the
Minnesota Department of Commerce’s attempt to regulate CBN as an insurance
company violated both the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and
the freedom of conscience clause in the Minnesota Constitution.375 Judge Beck did
not apply the rule from the Employment Division v. Smith case.376 Instead, Judge
Beck applied a “compelling state interest balancing test” and considered “whether
the objector’s belief is sincerely held, whether the state regulation burdens the
exercise of religious beliefs, whether the state interest in the regulation is overriding
or compelling, and whether the state regulation uses the least restrictive means.”377
The first factor was not in dispute.378 On the second factor, Judge Beck
concluded that CBN and “the Cookes have demonstrated that regulation would

religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Id. The Superior Court, applying Smith, held “the
regulation of CBN’s newsletter activities does not offend the U.S. or the Delaware
Constitution in this regard. The Insurance Code does not seek to prescribe or proscribe
religious beliefs of activities. It is valid and neutral in substance and in application.” Id. at
11-12.
370
In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc., No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003.
371

Id.

372

Id.

373

Id.

374

Id. (an administrative equivalent to a motion for summary judgment).

375

Id.

376

Id. See text at n. 78-80 (citing Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-879
(1990)). Administrative Law Judge Beck reasoned, “[t]he Cookes and the Respondents also
assert that they fall within an exception recognized in Smith for “hybrid” cases where more
than one constitutional right is involved. Even after Smith, a hybrid rights case will receive
strict scrutiny under the free exercise clause. … Since the solicitation of contributions is
protected free speech, it appears that this case involves more than one constitutional right and
would not be decided under the analysis applied in Smith. The hybrid analysis is similar to the
analysis employed under the Minnesota Constitution.” Id.
377

In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc., No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003.
378

Id.; see supra text accompanying note 85.
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burden the exercise of their beliefs.”379 The record demonstrated CBN’s health care
sharing ministry “is a vehicle for the expression of Christian faith by those who
subscribe.”380 Judge Beck noted, “[s]ome subscribers, such as the Cookes, contribute
monthly but make no medical expense claims. They do not use the newsletter as
insurance, but as a means of giving to others in need.”381 Other CBN subscribers
submitted affidavits stating that, “subscription to the newsletter is a voluntary
expression of Christian faith that allows subscribers to practice their sincere belief
that the Bible requires them to share one another’s burdens. They describe
participation in the newsletter as an act of worship.”382 Mr. Cooke stated “the
newsletter allows him to fulfill his obligation to God to contribute to the medical
needs of other Christians.”383 Judge Beck observed, “[t]he fact that subscribers are
willing to make monthly payments to CBN with a clear understanding that they are
promised nothing in return, indicates that there is a strong non-economic factor
involved.”384 Judge Beck also opined, “the free exercise of religion includes the
right to select the form of worship, at least where the state interest in regulation is
not strongly compelling.”385
On the third and fourth factors, the Department of Commerce did not establish
that regulating CBN as an insurance company was an overriding or compelling state
interest, nor did it demonstrate that “regulation as an insurance company is the least
restrictive alternative.”386 The Cookes argued the Department had shown no
compelling or overriding interest in light of the fact that the consumers apparently
needing the Department’s protection sought an exemption from those regulations.387
The affidavits of subscribers indicated they believed regulation unnecessary.388 The
Cookes argued the Department could achieve its interest through less restrictive
means, namely requiring CBN to use explicit warnings and disclaimers in its
correspondence.389 Judge Beck observed, “it appears that the explicit disclaimers
used by CBN have avoided complaints in the past, and presumably should do so in
the future.”390 In balancing these factors, Judge Beck concluded, “the infringement
on the sincere religious beliefs of CBN and its subscribers outweighs the
Department’s interest in regulation.”391
379
In re Barberton Rescue Mission, Inc., No. 1-1004-14523-2, State of Minn. Office of
Admin. Hearings for the Comm’r of Commerce, June 18, 2003.
380

Id.

381

Id.

382

Id.

383

Id.

384

Id.

385

Id.

386

Id.

387

Id.

388

Id.

389

Id.

390

Id.

391

Id.
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In conclusion, HCSMs are much more than a “purportedly biblically based
ministerial service”392 or an unregulated insurance substitute “operating under the
guise of religion.”393 Though HCSMs involve charity, HCSMs are more than a
charitable endeavor and they involve more than just simple altruism.394 HCSMs are
religious ministries, and members of HCSMs have the constitutional right to the free
exercise of their religious faith. This right goes far beyond mere charity or simple
altruism. This fundamental freedom requires that the courts and state insurance
regulators respect this individual right to share the medical financial burdens of
others according to one’s own conscience and religious convictions.
C. The Separation of Powers
A third reason why state courts should not view HCSMs as insurance lies in the
doctrine of the separation of powers. Simply, if state legislatures intended to include
HCSMs within the definition of insurance, the legislatures could do so without the
help of the judicial branch extending insurance laws to envelop HCSMs. The
California Supreme Court believed “a sound jurisprudence does not suggest the
extension, by judicial construction, of the insurance laws to govern every contract
involving an assumption of risk or indemnification of loss ….”395 In a case
involving a railroad’s voluntary relief fund, the New York Court of Appeals stated,
“[t]he defendant's relief department has been in existence more than 25 years, and if
the Legislature had intended to include such a department within the provisions of
section 201 of the Insurance Law, it would have used language therein to show such
intention.”396 Likewise, in regard to HCSMs, it is a temptation for courts to extend
insurance laws and envelop HCSMs at the behest of administrative officers. A sound
jurisprudence, however, does require or even suggest this extension. If the various
state legislatures intended to include HCSMs within the definition of insurance,
those legislatures would have used language to show that intention. This they have
not done.
The Kansas Supreme Court stated, regarding whether a certain cemetery
corporation was in the insurance business: “[i]f the legislature had considered preneed contracts to furnish such property as being within the realm of state insurance
regulation there would have been little occasion for the enactment of K.S.A. 16301.”397 Further, “this may be considered some indication of legislative intent as to
what is embraced within the insurance code. The entire subject is within legislative
392

Commonwealth v. Reinhold, No. 2007-CA-000661-MR, 2008 WL 4530900 (Ky. Ct.
App. Oct. 10, 2008) (Nickell, J., concurring in result only), rev’d, 325 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2010).
393

Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).

394

Commonwealth v. Reinhold, 325 S.W.3d 272, 278 (Ky. 2010) (“[W]e do not doubt the
claim that Medi–Share members are altruistically inspired . . . .” The majority also believed
the facts before them did not support the contention that Medi-Share members were “actually
undertaking a charitable endeavor and not attempting to shift the risk.”).
395

Transportation Guarantee Co. v. Jellins, 174 P.2d 625, 629 (Ca. 1946) ( “[T]hat when
the question arises each contract must be tested by its own terms as they are written, as they
are understood by the parties, and as they are applied under the particular circumstances
involved.”)
396

Colaizzi v. Pa. R.R. Co., 101 N.E. 859, 863 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1913).

397

Londerholm v. Anderson, 408 P.2d 864, 876 (Kan. 1966).
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compass and further supervision should be left to legislative direction.”398
Regarding a consumer cooperative, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia stated:
[E]xperience to date with consumer cooperatives, organized and limited
in their activities, management and membership as in Group Health, has
not shown that they are susceptible to the abuses feared. If they or others
should appear, measures for their control should be enacted by [sic] the
legislature, not prescribed through judicial expansion of existing statutes
designed for other organizations' activities and abuses.399
Similarly, if state legislatures considered HCSM “commitment contracts” to fall
in the realm of insurance, there would be little need for those state legislatures to
enact “safe harbor” statutes that define HCSMs. This fact should be considered at
least some indication of legislative intent. The subject of whether HCSMs are
“insurance” is within the legislative compass and further supervision should be left
to the state legislatures, not the judiciary or administrative officers. Likewise,
experience to date with HCSMs, organized and limited in their activities,
management, and membership, has not shown that they are susceptible to the abuses
certain state insurance commissioners fear.400 If such abuses should appear, state
legislatures may enact other HCSM-specific measures to regulate such abuses. The
judiciary should not expand existing insurance statutes that are “designed for other
organizations’ activities and abuses.”401
D. Implications of HCSMs’ Status as Charitable Organizations
HCSMs are 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charitable and religious organizations, and as
non-profit religious organizations HCSMs are under the regulatory oversight of the
state attorneys general.402 “In the common law,403 under the provisions of the

398

Id.

399

Jordan v. Group Health Ass’n, 107 F.2d 239, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1939).

400

See, e.g., supra Part 4.C.1.

401

Jordan, 107 F.2d at 253.

402

Mary Blasko, Curt Crossley & David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector,
28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (1993).
403

Id. (“The various American states almost unanimously adopted this principle, reasoning
that ‘the state, as parens patriae, superintends the management of all public charities or trusts,
and in these matters acts through her attorney general.’”). Blasko was quoting the California
Supreme Court, which opined at length:
[t]he state, as parens patriae, superintends the management of all public charities or
trusts, and in these matters acts through her attorney general. Generally speaking, such
an action will not be entertained at all unless the attorney general is a party to it. Such
was the rule at common law, and it has not been changed in this state. Even in those
states, such as Massachusetts, where by special statute the attorney general is
instructed to prosecute such actions, it is declared that the statute does not narrow or
diminish in this regard the common law powers incident to the office.
Ellert v. Cogswell, 45 P. 270, 271 (Cal. 1896) (citation omitted).
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Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act,404 and in the statutes of all
jurisdictions,405 the Attorney General has standing to supervise charities and enforce
their legal responsibilities.”406 “The attorneys general represent the public interest in
court in enforcing the fiduciary obligations charitable organizations undertake to the
public.”407 However, if judges or state insurance departments forget the authority of
the state attorneys general, they might assume that HCSMs would remain completely
unregulated if not subject to state insurance regulations. This assumption presents a
false dilemma, also known as the ‘logical fallacy of bifurcation,’ where “someone is
asked to choose between two options when there is at least one other option
available.”408 Thus, Judge Nickell of the Kentucky Court of Appeals wrote of
“Medi-Share’s unabashed attempt to avoid regulatory oversight and review
demanded of health insurers . . .”409
HCSMs are not attempting to avoid oversight. In fact, HCSMs cannot avoid the
supervisorial and enforcement oversight of the respective state attorneys general.
The specific structure of HCSMs and the “safe harbor” statutes keep HCSMs from
the specific regulatory oversight the states demand of health insurers. Thus, this
false dilemma bifurcates between the choices of either 1) regulatory oversight by
state insurance departments; or 2) absolutely no oversight at all. Interestingly, the
available option of attorneys general enforcement evidently did not surface on
Kentucky’s radar in the Reinhold lawsuit. This is not surprising, for the Kentucky
Attorney General’s Office had investigated no complaints at all regarding MediShare410 and would thus have no standing to bring a lawsuit against the Christian
Care Ministry and its Medi-Share program.
Attorney general supervision of HCSMs does work and destroys the “either/or”
of the false dilemma. The Ohio Attorney General filed suit against the Christian
Brotherhood Newsletter in 2001 and this suit is an example of a state’s attorney
general’s oversight over an HCSM.411 This Ohio lawsuit charged the founder of
CBN with fraud and conversion, and demanded the return of property and cash
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worth over $2.4 million dollars.412 After the lawsuit, CBN continued to operate
under new leadership with established safeguards to prevent such problems.413 Thus,
through the common law and state statute, state attorneys general have a check on
HCSMs. The state attorneys general have the legal ability to intervene if HCSMs are
abusing their authority and not using assets for their proper charitable purposes.
In conclusion, the status of HCSMs as nonprofit religious organizations brings
HCSMs under the supervisorial and enforcement authority of the state attorneys
general. State courts and insurance regulators should not assume that HCSMs need
additional regulatory oversight and review by subjecting these ministries to state
insurance regulations.
E. Federal Preemption Under PPACA
Finally, state legislators, regulators and courts should be aware that the
congressional action granting HCSM members a religious exemption from PPACA’s
individual mandate likely preempts the state regulation of HCSMs as insurance.414
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, “[t]he business of insurance, and every
person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate
to the regulation or taxation of such business.”415 McCarran-Ferguson then limits
state regulation of insurance so: “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . . .”416
The U.S. Supreme Court has employed a three-part test to determine whether the
McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts state law from preemption by a federal statute.417
The test is: “(1) whether the federal statute specifically relates to the business of
insurance; (2) whether the state law at issue was enacted for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance; and (3) whether the application of the federal
law invalidates, supersedes or impairs the state law.”418
First, PPACA specifically relates to the business of insurance. From there, at
least four scenarios are possible when applying McCarran-Ferguson’s test to
PPACA’s HCSM exemption. The first scenario occurred in Kentucky, where
Kentucky’s Supreme Court defined Medi-Share as “insurance” under Kentucky’s
insurance code.419 Thus, Kentucky meets the second element of the McCarran412
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Ferguson test, where state laws that define “insurance” regulate the business of
insurance. The key question in this scenario is whether the application of PPACA’s
“religious exemption” for HCSMs invalidates, supersedes or impairs the state law,
the third element. PPACA’s religious exemption for HCSM members features a
broad, inclusive definition of HCSMs. The text of PPACA defines the term “health
care sharing ministry” as an organization:
(I) which is described in section 501(c)(3) and is exempt from taxation
under section 501(a),
(II) members of which share a common set of ethical or religious beliefs
and share medical expenses among members in accordance with those
beliefs and without regard to the State in which a member resides or is
employed,
(III) members of which retain membership even after they develop a
medical condition,
(IV) which (or a predecessor of which) has been in existence at all times
since December 31, 1999, and medical expenses of its members have
been shared continuously and without interruption since at least
December 31, 1999, and
(V) which conducts an annual audit which is performed by an
independent certified public accounting firm in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and which is made available to the public
upon request.420
The application of the HCSM “religious exemption” from PPACA’s individual
mandate will impair Kentucky’s state law. Under Kentucky’s statutory definition of
insurance, the Reinhold court found Medi-Share was insurance. However, under
PPACA’s religious exemption, Medi-Share would meet all the broad elements
above, and would not be insurance, thus impairing Kentucky’s definition of
insurance. In this scenario, PPACA would preempt Kentucky’s statute, as applied in
Reinhold, and allow Medi-Share to operate in Kentucky.
The second scenario could play out through the HCSM “safe harbor” laws.
Under the second element of the McCarran-Ferguson test, many of these state
statutes arguably were enacted “for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance.”421 That is, these “safe harbor” laws define HCSMs and shelter these
ministries from the provisions of state insurance codes, thus “regulating the business
of insurance.” Perhaps more appropriately, these statutes regulate what is and what is
not the business of insurance. Given this assumption, a problem arises. Many of the
state HCSM “safe harbor” laws are much more specific than PPACA’s definition of
an HCSM.422 For example, Kentucky’s “Religious Publication” statute that
specifically requires HCSMs to pay “for the subscribers' financial or medical needs
by payments directly from one (1) subscriber to another.”423 PPACA’s “religious
exemption” merely requires each HCSM to “share medical expenses among

420

26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I-V) (West 2012).

421

King, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 528.

422

See, e.g., infra Appendix B; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6300; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6301.

423

KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 304.1–120(7)(d) (West 2012).

272

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 26:219

members in accordance with those beliefs”424 without regard to whether the sharing
of expenses occurs directly from member to member, or indirectly, through escrowtype accounts. In sum, the application of PPACA’s “religious exemption” would
invalidate, supersede or impair the state law in Kentucky’s “Religious Publication”
exemption used to define HCSMs.425 With this scenario, PPACA’s religious
exemption would preempt all narrower state law definitions of HCSMs and allow
HCSMs to operate in such states.
The third scenario might play out as follows. Under the second element of the
McCarran-Ferguson test, the state “safe harbor” laws that define HCSMs and shelter
these ministries from insurance regulations do not operate to regulate the business of
insurance.426 Rather, these state “safe harbor” laws operate to regulate and define
HCSMs, which are not insurance. Thus, as state “safe harbor” laws do not regulate
the business of insurance, the principles of the McCarran-Ferguson Act would
exempt such state “safe harbor” laws from preemption by PPACA’s “religious
exemption” for HCSMs.
The final scenario could operate as such. Congress has spoken on the issue of
HCSMs through PPACA, and PPACA’s “religious exemption” has decreed in
essence that HCSM membership is an acceptable alternative to PPACA’s
requirement to “maintain minimum essential [insurance] coverage.”427 The
application of PPACA’s religious exemption for HCSM membership would impair
narrower state laws enacted to regulate the business of insurance by defining what
HCSMs are.428 This fourth scenario would thus meet the three elements of the
McCarran Ferguson test.
With the fourth scenario, the Liability Risk Retention Act (LRRA) and its wellknown preemption of state-level insurance regulation are persuasive on what
regulatory authority the states would possess over HCSMs in the wake of PPACA.429
The LRRA exempts risk retention groups from “any State law, rule, regulation, or
order to the extent that such . . . would . . . make unlawful, or regulate, directly or
indirectly, the operation of a risk retention group.”430 Analogously, PPACA would
exempt HCSMs from any state law, rule, regulation or order to the extent the state’s
action would make the operation of HCSMs unlawful. Under LRRA’s persuasive
precedent, the states under PPACA could at the most require similar registration,
financial examination, and reporting requirements that the LRRA requires of risk
retention groups.431
In conclusion, there are many, many unknowns regarding PPACA’s effect on
HCSMs and HCSM members via the federal regulations that will implement
424
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PPACA. Whatever the future holds for HCSMs under PPACA’s regulatory regime,
PPACA most likely will preempt the state regulation of HCSMs under the legal
standards of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the LRRA’s analogous legal
principles.
VIII. Conclusion: The Reinhold Epilogue
After the remand of the Reinhold case, the Kentucky Department of Insurance
moved the Franklin County Circuit Court for a permanent injunction barring MediShare from operating in Kentucky outside the scope of a specific exemption.432 In
March 2011, Medi-Share agreed to an order for a permanent injunction prohibiting
their operations in Kentucky.433 Despite Medi-Share’s objections, the order
stipulated Medi-Share is insurance and not exempt from the insurance code, and
barred Medi-Share from transacting insurance in Kentucky, unless it obtained a
certificate of authority or license, or qualified for an exemption.434
Medi-Share sought to qualify for the exemption. Medi-Share’s representatives
met with the Department to discuss potential changes to the program.435 Medi-Share
hoped the changes would bring the HCSM within the scope of the exemption.436 The
Department issued a letter in April 2011 reiterating that Medi-Share did not qualify
for the exemption because Medi-Share did not feature direct payments between
subscribers, a promise to pay exists between the subscribers and Medi-Share, and the
monthly amounts due are specified by Medi-Share.437 Medi-Share requested an
administrative hearing to determine whether Medi-Share qualified for the exemption;
the Department denied Medi-Share’s request and simultaneously filed a Motion for
Contempt.438 The Department asserted Medi-Share continued to operate in violation
of the permanent injunction.439
Medi-Share responded by maintaining it modified its plan, thus complying with
K.R.S. § 304.1-120(7) and the Supreme Court’s ruling.440 The Franklin Circuit Court
held a hearing in August 2012.441 First, the Circuit Court did not find Medi-Share in
contempt.442 The court was unwilling to find Med-Share operated in violation of the
injunction willfully, knowingly or disrespectfully, as Medi-Share in good faith
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believed it complied with the exemption.443 Second, the court held that Medi-Share,
“even after modifications, remains noncompliant with the provisions of the
exemption as explicated by the Supreme Court in Reinhold.”444
The Circuit Court found that Medi-Share “still serves as an intermediary through
which monthly shares from subscribers are collected and held, pending use for
paying other subscribers’ medical needs.”445 Medi-Share provided testimony of
changes to its operations.446 Medi-Share’s members no longer submit payments to a
trust account.447 Rather, Medi-Share’s members transfer funds directly from their
own account to another member’s account.448 Members set up a designated credit
union account, deposit money on a monthly basis, and grant Medi-Share a limited
power of attorney to transfer money to cover costs and benefit other members.449
The Circuit Court concluded Medi-Share “still fails to comply with the Supreme
Court’s decision because ‘Medi-Share [still] determines which needs are paid, how
they are paid, and when they are paid.’”450 The Circuit Court then ordered MediShare to cease all operations in Kentucky unless it receives a certificate of authority
or license from the Department of Insurance.451
However, Medi-Share’s story in Kentucky is not over. First, the Christian Care
Ministry filed a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate the Franklin Circuit Court ruling
regarding the Medi-Share program,452 which the court heard on October 24, 2012.453
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The Christian Care Ministry argued that the court’s decision was not ripe, the court
misapplied the Kentucky Supreme Court’s standard from Commonwealth v.
Reinhold, and the court failed to acknowledge well-settled principles of agency law
that the actions of an attorney in fact under a power of attorney are the actions of the
principal.454
Second, on September 19, 2012, Kentucky Senator Tom Buford sponsored and
pre-filed an amendment to K.R.S. § 304.1-120.455 Among other things, the proposed
amendment seeks to delete the requirement of direct payment from one member to
another and delete the requirement that the HCSM state that member gift amounts
are voluntary with no assumption of risk or promise to pay.456 If amended, MediShare presumably would comply with K.R.S. § 304.1-120, “as explicated by the
Supreme Court in Reinhold.”457 The deletion of the direct sharing requirement and
the requirement to “suggest[] amounts to give that are voluntary”458 would permit
Medi-Share to act as an “intermediary” and “determine[] which needs are paid, how
they are paid, and when they are paid.”459 Senator Buford’s proposed amendment
would thus remove the legal support for the second part of the Reinhold decision and
also render moot the Franklin County Circuit Court’s recent Opinion and Order
applying that decision.
IX. Conclusion: Observations and Analysis
In conclusion, Health Care Sharing Ministries are not some kind of scam or “part
of the problem[s]” with America’s health care system.460 HCSMs are “part of the
solution”461 for America’s health care needs and this for several reasons. First,
HCSM membership exempts members from the individual mandate in the PPACA;
second, HCSMs are affordable for most qualifying individuals and families; and
lastly, HCSMs demonstrate the faith, values, caring, and ideals “all too often lacking
in many health insurance options available today.”462
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First, as noted above, the PPACA grants a religious exemption for HCSM
members from the mandate to purchase insurance.463 HCSM members are exempt
from the individual mandate precisely because HCSM members are paying their bills
and sharing other members’ medical expenses.464 HCSMs are an established feature
in the American health care landscape with a healthy thirty-year track record.
HCSMs and their “members are here, they’re paying their bills.”465 This religious
exemption from PPACA’s individual mandate, coupled with HCSMs’ low rates
when compared to health insurance, has contributed to increased interest in HCSM
membership with Samaritan Ministries.466 Tony Meggs, Medi-Share’s President and
CEO, reported “Medi-Share’s steady growth ‘accelerated’ after the [PP]ACA was
enacted,” and he expected “that growth to continue because . . . there is about a 40
percent cost difference between an individual health insurance plan and a monthly
Medi-Share contribution.”467
Second, HCSMs offer a cost-effective method to pay for the rising costs of health
care, when compared to health insurance policies.468 In 2010, the Citizens’ Council
on Health Care prepared a chart comparing HCSM memberships to health insurance
policies, figured for a family of four.469 First, the costs for a health insurance plan
with a $5,000 deductible ranged between $300 and $400 per month, depending upon
location, while the costs for a HCSM membership ranged from $240 to $400.470
Second, HCSM members typically pay for the first $250 to $500 of any qualifying
medical expenses per month; the rest is “published” or shared through the
ministry.471 In addition, HCSM members needs potentially may be fully “published”
or shared.472 In contrast, a $5,000 deductible health insurance policy requires the
463
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insured to pay up to 30% of the total bill for large expenses.473 Third, HCSM
applicants are generally “never refused membership based upon previous medical
conditions,” while insurance applicants “may be refused coverage due to prior
conditions such as cancer, tobacco use, etc.”474 Fourth, HCSM members “may use
any doctor or hospital without restriction,” while some insurance “plans specify
which doctors may be used. Access to specialist care may be restricted.”475
In addition, the Christian Healthcare Ministry (CHM) provided a cost
comparison between its “Gold Level” participation and average 2010 prices for
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) plans, Preferred Provider Organization
(PPO) plans, and Point of Service (POS) plans.476 The HMO, PPO, and POS family
plans all cost over $1,100 per month, while CHM’s “Gold Level” plan costs $450.
The HMO, PPO, and POS individual plans cost between $427 and $437, while
CHM’s “Gold Level” individual plan costs $150.477 Thus, just from the savings
alone, both through lower monthly “shares” as contrasted to premiums and much
lower “deductibles,” HCSMs represent a financially sustainable means for ensuring
the payment of the high costs of health care in the United States.
Third, HCSMs are not merely an affordable substitute for insurance; HCSMs
present a completely different option – and thus, the states should not seek to
regulate HCSMs as if they were insurance. HCSMs “demonstrate the patientcentered values, religious principles, free market ideals, charity, community focus,
and compassion for fellow human beings that is all too often lacking in many health
insurance options available today.”478 According to Mr. James Lansberry, Samaritan
Ministries’ Vice President, HCSMs are a unique and viable alternative to health
insurance companies because of the “community approach to healthcare . . . .”479
Lansberry continued, “[t]hat makes this better than anything else out there . . . . We
are trying to re-personalize healthcare, or put the care back into healthcare.”480
Indeed, the community focus of HCSMs hearkens back to centuries-old Amish
practices,481 who believe “it is their religious duty to help those in need, particularly
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those from their own community.”482 The Amish call this “Mutual Aid,” and the
Amish fulfill this duty in several ways, one being by sharing the high costs of
hospital bills, somewhat like a localized HCSM.483 Interestingly, Amish Mutual Aid
went unchallenged for generations until the advent of Social Security.484 The Amish
refused to pay the federal taxes for Social Security, believing Social Security was an
insurance policy that violated their religious beliefs.485 The Amish eventually won an
exemption from Social Security.486 The Amish and other similar religious groups
also have a “religious conscience exemption” from PPACA’s “individual
mandate.”487 Much like the Amish resistance to Social Security, HCSMs continue to
work, state by state, for these “safe harbor” provisions from insurance regulations.488
HCSMs have also secured a religious exemption from PPACA’s individual mandate,
and rightly so, for in a powerful and compelling way, these religious health care
sharing ministries return many back to the concept of “bearing one another’s
burdens,” where “mutual aid” was the “foundation of social welfare in the United
States.”489
In conclusion, state legislatures should enact “safe harbor” provisions for
HCSMs – and defer to federal regulation of HCSMs under PPACA, because some
state insurance departments likely will continue to challenge HCSMs.490 Yet, why do
state insurance departments seek to conform HCSMs to the image of insurance?
Why, as one judge noted with a touch of irony, do “the consumers apparently
needing the Department’s protection seek an exemption from those regulations”?491
Perhaps one reason some state insurance officials view HCSMs with suspicion lies
with the fact “our mentality has moved far from that of our ancestors.”492 Indeed,
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the Alliance of Health Care Sharing Ministries notes, “we hardly know what . . . the
mandate to bear one another’s burdens . . . . means anymore.”493 Thus, for many of
us, “[i]f an emergency medical problem arises, the government or the insurance
company takes care of it, and our friends, relatives and neighbors have little
participation in restoring us to our former state.”494 In the words of Indiana Insurance
Commissioner James Atterholt, “all regulators [should] respect citizens’ rights to
freely pursue their own solutions for their medical expenses, and recognize HCSMs
for what they are: charitable organizations serving individuals who voluntarily
support one another in their time of need.”495 In sum, HCSMs should be protected
and not put off as insurance scams. HCSMs should be helped, not hindered, as the
many thousands of HCSM members seek to “[b]ear one another’s burdens, and thus
fulfill the law of Christ.”496
APPENDIX A: STATE AND FEDERAL CASE LAW LISTING THE ASSUMPTION OF THE
RISK AS AN ELEMENT OF INSURANCE
1.

Alabama: “Insurance exists when a contractual relationship between the
insurer and the insured shifts the risk of loss from the insured to the insurer.”
Warehouse Home Furnishing Distribs., Inc. v. Whitson, 709 So. 2d 1144,
1152 (Ala. 1997) (citation omitted).
Arizona: “Five elements are normally present in an insurance contract,
which include: 1. An insurable interest; 2. A risk of loss; 3. An assumption
of the risk by the insurer; 4. A general scheme to distribute the loss among
the larger group of persons bearing similar risks; 5. The payment of a
premium for the assumption of risk.” Guaranteed Warranty Corp., Inc. v.
State ex rel. Humphrey, 533 P.2d 87, 90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (citations
omitted).
California: “Essential to insurance is the element of shifting of the risk of
loss, subject to contingent or future events, by legally binding agreement.”
Richardson v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 207 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (citation omitted).
“Insurance Code section 22 (section 22) defines insurance as “a
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss,
damage, or liability arising from a contingent or unknown event.”
Section 22 has been interpreted as requiring two elements: (1) shifting
one party's risk of loss to another party; and (2) distribution of that risk
among similarly situated persons.” Auto. Funding Grp, Inc. v.
Garamendi, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 912, 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citation
omitted).
Delaware: “Insurance, in its basic operation, involves the setting aside of
money to establish a fund sufficient to respond to claims arising from
predictable risks. Whether the funding be through contract with an
independent insurer, or self-funding, or a combination of the two through
partial self-insurance in the form of deductibles, the result is the same. A
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3.

4.
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Id.

494

Id.
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Letter from James Atterholt to James Lansberry (May 7, 2009) (on file with author).

496

Galatians 6:2.
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fund is created to protect against risk of bodily harm or property damage.”
Stop & Shop Cos., Inc. v. Gonzales, 619 A.2d 896, 898 (Del. 1993) (citation
omitted).
5. District of Columbia: “The primary elements of an insurance contract are the
spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk. It is characteristic of
insurance that a number of risks are accepted, some of which involve losses,
and that such losses are spread over all the risks so as to enable the insurer to
accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible liability upon it.” Carter v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 808 A.2d 466, 472 (D.C. 2002) (citations
omitted).
“Whether the contract is one of insurance or of indemnity there must be a
risk of loss to which one party may be subjected by contingent or future
events and an assumption of it by legally binding arrangement by another.
Even the most loosely stated conceptions of insurance and indemnity require
these element. Hazard is essential and equally so a shifting of its incidence.
If there is no risk, or there being one it is not shifted to another or others,
there can be neither insurance nor indemnity. Insurance also, by the better
view, involves distribution of the risk, but distribution without assumption
hardly can be held to be insurance. These are elemental conceptions and
controlling ones.” Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C.
Cir. 1939) (finding a group health association not insurance).
6. Florida: “Whether the contract is one of insurance or of indemnity there
must be a risk of loss to which one party may be subjected by contingent or
future events and an assumption of it by legally binding arrangement by
another. Even the most loosely stated conceptions of insurance and
indemnity require these element[s]. Hazard is essential.... If there is no risk,
... there can be [no] insurance.” Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. v. Abernathy, 93
So. 3d 352, 359 (Fla. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted).
7. Georgia: “Broadly defined, insurance is a contract by which one party, for a
compensation called the premium, assumes particular risks of the other party
and promises to pay to him or his nominee a certain or ascertainable sum of
money on a specified contingency.” Bankers' Health & Life Ins. Co. v.
Knott, 154 S.E. 194, 196 (Ga. Ct. App. 1930) (citation omitted).
8. Idaho: ““Insurance” is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify
another or pay or allow a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon
determinable risk contingencies.” “…coverage for real and determinable
risks … therefore comes within the statutory definition of insurance.”
Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 18 P.3d 956, 961 (Idaho 2000).
9. Illinois: “Thus, it appears that “insurance” can be characterized as involving:
(1) a contract or agreement between an insurer and an insured which exists
for a specific period of time; (2) an insurable interest (usually property)
possessed by the insured; (3) consideration in the form of a premium paid by
the insured to the insurer; and (4) the assumption of risk by the insurer
whereby the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured for potential pecuniary
loss to the insured's property resulting from certain specified perils.” Griffin
Sys., Inc. v. Washburn, 505 N.E.2d 1121, 1123-24 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987).
10. Indiana: “Generally, insurance is a contract of indemnity through which a
party undertakes an obligation to compensate another against loss arising
from certain specified contingencies or perils by shifting the risk of loss
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from the insured to the insurer.” Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 654
N.E.2d 861, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted).
Iowa: “[T]o be considered insurance, the assumption of risk by the promoter
must be the ‘principal object and purpose of the program.’” Barberton
Rescue Missions, Inc. v. Ins. Div. of the Iowa Dep’t of Commerce, 586
N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted).
“A contract is one of insurance if it meets the following test: one
party, for compensation, assumes the risk of another; the party who
assumes the risk agrees to pay a certain sum of money on a specified
contingency; and the payment is made to the other party or the party's
nominee.” Iowa Contractors Workers' Comp. Grp. v. Iowa Ins. Guar.
Ass'n, 437 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Iowa 1989) (citation omitted).
Kansas: “Whether a company is engaged in the insurance business depends
* * * on the character of the business that it transacts * * * and whether the
assumption of a risk, or some other matter to which it is related, is the
principal object and purpose of the business.” State ex rel. Londerholm v.
Anderson, 408 P.2d 864, 875 (Kan. 1966) (citation omitted).
Kentucky: “An insurance policy is a contract of indemnity whereby the
insurer agrees to indemnify the insured for any loss resulting from a specific
event. The insurer undertakes the obligation based on an evaluation of the
market's wide risks and losses. An insurer expects losses, and they are
actuarially predicted. The cost of such losses are spread through the market
by means of a premium.” Buck Run Baptist Church, Inc. v. Cumberland Sur.
Ins. Co., 983 S.W.2d 501, 504-505 (Ky. 1998).
Louisiana: “The primary characteristic of the business of insurance is the
transferring or spreading of risk. So long as this characteristic is present, the
business of insurance is not limited to traditionally recognized areas of
insurance.” Louisiana Safety Ass'n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v.
Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 17 So.3d 350, 358, n.27 (La. 2009) (internal
citation omitted).
Maryland: “Thus an insurance contract is one whereby for a stipulated
consideration one party undertakes to compensate the other for loss on a
specified subject by specified perils.” Chicago Bonding & Ins. Co. v.
Oliner, 115 A. 592, 593 (Md. 1921) (citation omitted).
Michigan: “Insurance is a contract in which one party, for consideration,
assumes delineated risks of the other party.” King v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
668 N.W.2d 357, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citation omitted).
Minnesota: “An insurance policy essentially shifts the risk of loss from the
insured to the insurer whereby the insurer assumes the risk of loss and
undertakes to indemnify the insured against such loss.” Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Dynamic Air, Inc., 702 N.W.2d 237, 244 (Minn. 2005)
(citation omitted).
Mississippi: “Mississippi recognizes that an insured bargains for more than
mere eventual monetary proceeds of a policy; insureds bargain for such
intangibles as risk aversion, peace of mind, and certain and prompt payment
of the policy proceeds upon submission of a valid claim.” Andrew Jackson
Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1179, n.9 (Miss. 1990).
Nebraska: “Insurance is a contract by which one party assumes specified
risks of the other party for a consideration, and promises to pay him or his
beneficiary an ascertainable sum of money on the happening of a specified
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contingency.” Adolf v. Union Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 101 N.W.2d 504, 508-509
(Neb. 1960).
New Hampshire: “The common definition of ‘insurance’ includes both ‘the
action or process of insuring ... against loss or damage by a contingent event
(as death, fire, accident, or sickness’ and ‘a device for the elimination or
reduction of an economic risk common to all members of a large group and
employing a system of equitable contributions out of which losses are
paid,’” New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n Emp. Benefit Trust v. New
Hampshire Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 914 A.2d 812, 815 (N.H. 2006) (internal
citation omitted).
New Jersey: “The essence of an insurance contract is the shifting of the risk
of loss from the insured to the insurer. The essence of self-insurance, a term
of colloquial currency rather than of precise legal meaning, is the retention
of the risk of loss by the one upon whom it is directly imposed by law or
contract.” American Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 471 A.2d 66, 69
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (internal citation omitted).
New Mexico: “Insurance is a contract whereby for consideration one party
agrees to indemnify or guarantee another party against specified risks. . . . In
contrast, self-insurance is a process of risk retention whereby an entity
‘set[s] aside assets to meet foreseeable future losses.’. . . A self-insurer
protects itself from liability; it does not assume the risk of another.” Cordova
v. Wolfel, 903 P.2d 1390, 1392 (N.M. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
New York: “The contract of insurance is an agreement whereby, for a
stipulated consideration or premium, the insurance company undertakes to
indemnify the other against certain risks in which that party has an interest
recognized by law.” Home Ins. Co. v. Bernstein, 16 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47 (N.Y.
Mun. Ct. 1939).
North Carolina: “One characteristic of an insurance contract is the shifting of
a risk from the insured to the insurer. If no risk is shifted there is not an
insurance contract.” Blackwelder v. City of Winston-Salem, 420 S.E.2d
432, 435 (N.C. 1992) (internal citation omitted).
Ninth Circuit: “The ‘underwriting or spreading of risk’ was held to be an
‘indispensable characteristic of insurance.’” Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass'n v.
Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1983) (citation
omitted).
Ohio: “‘Broadly defined, insurance is a contract by which one party, for a
compensation called the premium, assumes particular risks of the other party
and promises to pay to him or his nominee a certain or ascertainable sum of
money on a specified contingency.’” State ex rel. Duffy v. Western Auto
Supply Co., 16 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ohio 1938) (internal citation omitted).
South Dakota: “‘The essence of an insurance contract is the shifting of the
risk of loss from the insured to the insurer.’” ‘Shifting the risk’ can be
defined as ‘the transfer of the impact of a potential loss from the insured to
the insurer.’” State Div. of Ins. v. Norwest Corp., 581 N.W.2d 158, 161
(S.D. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
Texas: “Broadly defined, insurance is a contract by which one party for a
consideration assumes particular risks of the other party and promises to pay
him or someone named by him a certain or ascertainable sum of money on a
specified contingency.” Denton v. Ware, 228 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. App.
1949) (internal citation omitted).
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29. Utah: “The Utah Insurance Code defines insurance as “an arrangement,
contract, or plan for the transfer of a risk or risks from one or more persons
to one or more other persons.” Pugh v. North Am. Warr. Servs., Inc., 1 P.3d
570, 574 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (internal citation omitted).
30. Virginia: “With self-insurance, there is neither an insured nor an insurer. In
fact, self-insurance does not involve the transfer of a risk of loss, but rather a
retention of that risk, making it the ‘antithesis of insurance.’” Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 708 S.E.2d 852, 857 (Va. 2011) (internal
citation omitted).
31. Washington: “Life insurance involves both risk-shifting and riskdistributing. A contract may be a risk-shifting device, but to be a contract of
insurance, which is a risk-distributing device, it must possess both features,
and unless it does it is not a contract of insurance whatever be its name or its
form.” In re Smiley's Estate, 216 P.2d 212, 214 (Wash. 1950) (citation
omitted).
APPENDIX B: STATES WITH “SAFE HARBOR” STATUTES FOR HCSMS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Alabama – ALA. CODE § 22-6A-3 (2012) (effective 2012).
Arizona – ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-122 (2012) (effective 2011).
Florida – FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.1265 (West 2012) (effective 2008).
Georgia – GA. CODE ANN. § 33-1-20 (West 2012) (effective 2011).
Iowa – IOWA CODE ANN. § 505-22 (West 2012) (effective 1995).
Illinois – 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4(b) (West 2012) (effective 2013).
Indiana – IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-2.1-1, 1-2 (West 2012) (effective 2012).
Kansas – KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-202(j) (West 2012).
Kentucky – KY. REV. STAT. § 304.1-120 (7) (West 2012).
Maryland – MD. CODE. ANN., INS. §1-202 (4) (West 2012).
Maine – ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 704 (3) (West 2012).
Missouri – MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1750 (West 2012) (effective 2007).
New Hampshire – N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126-V:1 (2013) (effective 2012).
North Carolina – N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-49-12 (West 2012) (effective
2011).
Oklahoma – OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 110-11 (West 2012).
Pennsylvania – 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 23 (West 2012) (effective 1994).
South Dakota – S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-1-3.3 (2012) (effective 2012).
Utah – UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-1-103(3)(c) (West 2012).
Virginia – VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-6300, 6301 (West 2012) (effective 2008).
Washington – WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.009 (West 2012).
Wisconsin – WIS. STAT. ANN. § 600.01 (1)(b)(9) (West 2012).

